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1. Executive summary
1. Ukraine will become a direct neighbour of the European Union on 1 
May 2004, when Poland, Hungary and Slovakia enter the EU. This creates 
new challenges and opportunities for the EU and Ukraine, which have agre-
ed to strengthen their relationship.
2. Membership in the EU is one of Ukraine’s main strategic goals. The 
EU has so far not acknowledged Ukraine as a prospective member of the 
EU. However, according to Article 49 of the EU Treaty, the EU is open to all 
European countries, and Ukraine is, after all, a European country. The EU’s 
current position vis-à-vis Ukraine is unsustainable, as a matter of principle. 
Moreover, this position limits the EU’s influence on developments in Ukra-
ine, as it prevents the use of the EU’s most powerful foreign policy instru-
ment, namely the conditions of the accession process.
3. Ukraine’s transition to a market-based liberal democracy is far from 
complete. Limited economic progress in recent years has been offset by ne-
gative political developments undermining the rule of law and the freedom 
of the media. This undermines the credibility of Ukraine and its purported 
European aspirations.
4. Ukrainian elites need to acknowledge that the prospect of member-
ship is given as much as a reward for domestic efforts as a means to influ-
ence the pace and shape of reforms. Eventual accession is not determined 
by geopolitical considerations, but by the political, economic, legal and so-
10
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cial situation in the candidate country. In short, European integration starts 
and ends at home. Declarations on Ukraine’s European aspirations and de-
mands to the EU for timetables for ‘association’ and membership are coun-
terproductive, unless accompanied by serious efforts to fulfil the criteria for 
EU membership. 
5. Ukraine should avoid making commitments that could prevent the re-
alisation of their EU ambitions, for instance through full participation in the 
later stages of the Common Economic Space between Russia, Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan and Ukraine in September 2003. Participation in a customs union 
with CIS partners is incompatible with EU membership.
6. This leaves the EU with a dilemma: acknowledging Ukraine as a po-
tential EU member would be to reward the lack of reform, which would not 
be desirable. On the other hand, this deprives the Ukrainian people of their 
legitimate right as Europeans to take part in the European project. 
7. The EU should acknowledge that Ukraine is, as a European country, 
a potential member of the EU. Though it should simultaneously be empha-
sised that it is neither inevitable nor likely to materialise in the foreseeable 
future. Ukraine does not currently fulfil any of the Copenhagen criteria, and 
may indeed be moving further away from fulfilling some of them, including 
those concerned with basic European values and principles. 
8. In the short- to medium-term, the principal task is to strengthen the 
relationship through the progressive adoption by Ukraine of EU rules and 
standards followed by the gradual inclusion of Ukraine in EU policies. 
9. The new members of the EU, and in particular those bordering Ukra-
ine (Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), have a strong interest in playing a key 
role in strengthening EU policy towards Ukraine. Also, these countries have 
considerable experience of value to Ukraine, both as concerns how to suc-
cessfully undertake the process of political and economic transition and how 
to deal with the challenges of EU accession. Ukraine could be included in 
many of the areas of co-operation among the Visegrad countries (Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), for instance through strengthened 
cross-border co-operation, including facilitation of the movement of people 
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between Ukraine and the Visegrad countries and the establishment of a jo-
int peacekeeping force, Centreurofor.
10. A road map should be developed outlining specific steps towards 
Ukraine’s integration with the EU. While a timetable with specific dates is 
not credible, as progress along the ‘road’ depends almost entirely on Ukra-
ine itself, this road map could constitute the core of the Action Plans curren-
tly being developed as part of the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative.
11. The proposed road map consists of four distinct stages: beginning 
with a political declaration initiating the process, followed by a ‘pre-associa-
tion’ stage, association and, possibly, finally candidate status. Clear bench-
marks should be developed across all policy areas, spelling out the criteria 
that must be fulfilled in earlier stages to move further towards candidate 
status for Ukraine in the longer-term.
• Political declaration. The Action Plan should be accompanied by a uni-
lateral political declaration by the EU. This should acknowledge that Ukra-
ine – as a European country – is eligible in principle for EU membership. 
This declaration would further spell out the conditions for starting negotia-
tions on an association agreement. The declaration should be published as 
soon as possible.
• Pre-association phase. Co-operation between Ukraine and the EU is 
continuously being expanded, but there is scope for a further strengthe-
ning in the short-term. Dialogue on security and defence issues could be 
expanded, as could Ukrainian participation in European Security and De-
fence Policy (ESDP) operations, with a significant role for Ukraine particu-
larly pertinent in Transnistria. In the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), 
Ukraine could abolish visa requirements for EU citizens, while the EU sho-
uld introduce the ‘easy-visas’ to facilitate movement of people across the 
Ukraine-EU frontier. In economics, market economy status and World Tra-
de Organisation (WTO) membership for Ukraine could be accompanied 
by the removal of trade restrictions in areas of Ukrainian comparative ad-
vantage (for instance agriculture, steel and textiles), as well as a gradu-
al removal of Ukrainian import tariffs. Furthermore, Ukraine could be im-
1. Executive summary
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mediately included in a number of EU programmes and activities, for in-
stance on education, research and culture, which represent long-term in-
vestments and should not be subject to any conditions beyond quality. Li-
kewise, the EU should consider broadening existing mechanisms and cre-
ating new ones to support civil society development and assist in raising 
a new generation of pro-European activists. The decision to give respon-
sibility for Ukraine and the Wider Europe to the Commissioner for Enlar-
gement was good, and this division of responsibility should be kept in the 
new Commission in 2004.
• Association. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) is out-
dated and a new agreement is needed. The new agreement should incor-
porate the range of issues on which the EU and Ukraine already co-opera-
te, for instance JHA and security and defence, which is not included in the 
PCA. The new agreement would also formalise and institutionalise the prac-
tices introduced in the pre-association phase (ESDP, Community programmes 
etc). Clear benchmarks must be established in order to make it possible to 
agree on objective grounds for implementation, which should be the sub-
ject of strict monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Conclusion of this 
agreement should be subject to stricter criteria than under current EU asso-
ciation arrangements. These should be a ‘softer’ version of EU membership 
criteria, including the basic principles and values of the EU and all the poli-
tical criteria. They should differ from the Copenhagen criteria mainly concer-
ning economic and legal issues, for instance competitiveness of Ukrainian 
economy and approximation and implementation of the acquis, a process 
bound to take a long time. The association should develop step-by-step in 
line with the Europe Agreements. In trade, the gradual removal of EU bar-
riers and Ukrainian barriers would lead to a free trade area followed by the 
gradual inclusion of Ukraine into the single market. Visa-free travel should 
be envisaged during the period of association. The progressive inclusion in 
institutions should be strictly conditional on the fulfilment of association cri-
teria. Economic assistance should be increased and targeted towards ma-
king Ukraine ‘EU compatible’.
13
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• Pre-accession phase. Ukraine would need to prove sustained efforts to-
wards reform and implementation of the association agreement in order to 
be acknowledged as a candidate for EU membership. Negotiations on Ukra-
ine’s eventual accession to the EU could commence following the implemen-
tation of the association agreement.
1. Executive summary
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2. Introduction
2.1. Justification
EU security and stability is inherently linked with that of Europe as a who-
le. As was recognised in the Wider Europe Communication, interdependen-
ce – political and economic – with the Union’s neighbours is already a re-
ality. Hence, security and stability in Europe largely depends on the policy 
of the EU towards the rest of Europe. As it is based on the principle of de-
mocracy and rule of law, the EU’s political and economic policy might give 
it particular leverage which facilitates the spread of these values and prin-
ciples outside its boundaries. 
So far, the EU has avoided this issue and adopted a policy of limited en-
gagement with its future/post-enlargement Eastern neighbours, with the 
partial exception of Russia because of the importance of the latter and its 
common border with the EU. 
The EU has placed greater emphasis on preventing instability impinging 
from outside, rather than on the need to export stability beyond the acces-
sion states. The EU’s policy towards Ukraine has been a mix of different po-
licy measures stemming from the recognition that Ukraine is too big to be 
ignored, and fears of soft security threats emanating from the country. The 
latter agenda tends to reduce relations with Ukraine to problems of migra-
tion, borders and international crime.
15
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From May 2004, Ukraine will become a direct neighbour of the enlar-
ged EU as it borders three of the member states (Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia). Given this long common border, the presence of ethnic minori-
ties, long-standing historical ties and substantial cross-border co-opera-
tion it cannot effectively be cordoned off, and the EU should actively pro-
mote regional and sub-regional co-operation and integration as a me-
ans of ensuring political stability and economic development. The reluc-
tance to embrace the challenge of Wider Europe would be detrimental 
to the objectives that the EU has set itself for Wider Europe, notably the 
promotion of stability, prosperity, shared values and the rule of law. Rela-
tions with Ukraine are key to the policies of the EU toward non-EU Euro-
pean countries. After Russia and Turkey, Ukraine is the biggest, in terms 
of size and population, non-EU European country and it has expressed a 
desire to join the EU. 
The case of Ukraine is a litmus test for the EU’s policy in Wider Europe. 
Undoubtedly, its membership aspirations raise a number of concerns within 
the EU. There is considerable fear of endless expansion and impending pa-
ralysis of EU institutions as a result of the 2004 enlargement, despite the re-
forms undertaken aimed at adapting institutions and procedures to accom-
modate the larger number of member states. Already the 2004 enlargement 
has put significant strains on the EU’s institutions, internal cohesion and bud-
get; further enlargement could trigger a backlash of public opinion. Given 
that the number of states offered the more or less clear prospect of mem-
bership include Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ser-
bia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, as well as the members of the 
EFTA (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland), whose membership 
would be relatively straightforward, the question of how far enlargement 
can go is highly pertinent. So far, the EU has refused to extend the prospect 
of membership to two former Soviet countries, Ukraine and Moldova, whi-
le admitting the Baltic republics. In other words, despite their explicit desi-
re to join the EU, only these two European countries have not even been of-
fered the prospect of membership. 
2. Introduction
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Undoubtedly, Ukraine has done a lot to undermine the credibility of its 
stated intentions. Ukraine’s pro-European declarations have not so far been 
backed-up by deed, as evidenced by stuttering economic and political re-
forms. The ‘stop-go’ pattern of economic reforms, combined with evident 
violations of democratic standards and social deprivation on a massive sca-
le, has created an image of Ukraine as a case of ‘post-Soviet failure’. At the 
same time, however, Ukraine has not experienced the type of conflict or cri-
ses characterising the experience of several countries in the Western Bal-
kans, something which, ironically, would most likely have pushed Ukraine 
higher up the EU’s agenda. 
Notwithstanding the declarations of the current leadership of the coun-
try, the pro-reformers in Ukraine look towards the EU to play a similar cata-
lytic role that it did in stimulating the reform process in East-Central Euro-
pe. There, the political and economic transformation became equated with 
preparation for EU membership.
Given its geopolitical importance, Ukraine can play an important role 
in the EU’s challenge of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). It can do so by offering the EU an opportunity to develop a new po-
licy, a common stance with an external partner in the enlarged EU, one inc-
luding both new and old member states. 
Moreover, Ukraine’s importance for the EU stems from its location as a 
major transit route for energy (gas and crude oil) from Russia. Therefore, 
the security of energy supplies to much of the EU depends on the political 
and economic stability of Ukraine.
Ukraine is a European country of nearly 50 million people with a consi-
derable economic potential. Yet, the country is far from stabilised, let alo-
ne democratic and prosperous, and the developments in the country are 
precarious. Ukraine has regressed in terms of democratisation for the last 
several years, but experienced steady economic growth since 2000. The 
next several years are likely to be decisive for Ukraine. At the same time, 
the realisation of Ukraine’s economic potential and the resulting prospe-
rity would have a considerable impact on Europe as a whole. As a mini-
17
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mum, given its size and location, a successful Ukraine would be a good 
example for eastern Europe, and thereby could play a stabilising role in 
Wider Europe.
Overcoming the current impasse in Ukraine-EU relations, characterised 
by long-standing misunderstandings and accumulated frustration on both 
sides, would be of benefit for both the enlarged EU and Ukraine. The conti-
nuation of the present situation is detrimental to the objective the EU sets 
itself in Wider Europe and Ukraine’s efforts to overcome its domestic chal-
lenges.
2.2. Aim and structure of the report
The March 2003 ‘Communication from the Commission on Wider Europe’ 
and the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe opened the de-
bate on the EU’s role on the European continent.  This report suggests that 
both Ukraine and the EU might benefit from a fundamental and comprehen-
sive reappraisal of relations. It makes some wide-ranging policy proposals 
in order to foster closer ties between the two parties and various sub-par-
ties (e.g. Ukraine and new member states). 
The comprehensive nature of the report means that it is addressed to a 
wide range of readers, including EU officials, officials and opinion makers 
in existing member states as well as in the prospective member states that 
border Ukraine (Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and, last but not least, Ukra-
inian authorities and opinion-makers. 
The report is divided into three parts. Part One is actor-oriented. 
It consists of three agendas, namely: the EU’s agenda for Ukraine, Ukra-
ine’s agenda for the EU, and EU-Ukraine relations in the agenda of the 
new member states. These agendas contain concrete and specific sti-
pulations on how to structure mutual relations between Ukraine and 
the EU. 
Part Two is issue oriented. It contains a number of recommendations for 
the key areas of co-operation between the enlarged EU and Ukraine, name-
2. Introduction
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ly economic co-operation, Justice and Home Affairs, CFSP/ESDP, Civil Socie-
ty and Cross-Border Co-operation (CBC).
Part Three brings together the issues from Parts One and Two by offe-
ring a concise Road Map, which outlines steps for Ukraine’s integration in 
the EU.
19
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3. Three agendas
3.1. EU’s agenda for Ukraine
3.1.1. Ukraine’s Place in the EU’s European policy
EU policy towards Ukraine should be considered in a wider context. The 
EU needs to address the process of foreign policy formulation following the 
upcoming, ‘Big Bang’ enlargement, as well as the proposed EU constitution. 
This new policy could be divided into two parts:
• European Affairs, which would include policy towards all European co-
untries that are not members of the EU. There are currently three such gro-
ups: 1) countries currently acknowledged as candidates for EU membership 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey), 2) European countries that at present do not 
seek EU membership (such as the remaining EFTA countries) and 3) coun-
tries for whom the prospect of membership is very distant (i.e. some Balkan 
countries, post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). The 
countries covered by the prospective ‘European Affairs Policy’ are, needless 
to say, very different. The principle of differentiation would thus need to be 
a central element of such a new European policy.
• Global Affairs, where in the future the EU would like to figure as one 
of the main actors. 
These two policies need different tools, as recognised in the propo-
sed constitution of the EU, where a special article is proposed for the EU’s 
20
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European neighbours. A new portfolio on ‘European Affairs’ could be one 
of the main tools in the implementation of ‘European Affairs Policy’ in the 
next Commission. The Commissioner on ‘European Affairs’ should be re-
sponsible for the negotiation process with candidates on the one hand, and 
for the development of relations with countries which will be in pre-nego-
tiation positions on the other, as well as for relations with European states 
which are not seeking membership. The decision to put Enlargement Com-
missioner Günter Verheugen in charge of the Wider Europe Task Force, is a 
step in the right direction.
This proposed division creates particular challenges for relations with 
Russia. While important aspects of the relationship clearly pertain to ‘Euro-
pean Affairs’ (for example, the Kaliningrad issue), Russia wants to be a play-
er in ‘Global Affairs’, and the EU-Russia relationship is likely to have a glo-
bal component far beyond the EU’s relations with its other European neigh-
bours. In its strategy on the EU, Russia clearly underlines that it wants to be 
an equal partner with the EU as a whole, and that it does not seek either 
membership or association with the EU. Thus, a special arrangement ne-
eds to be worked out for relations with Russia, covering both their Europe-
an and global aspects.
The Wider Europe Communication divides the post-Soviet space (exclu-
ding the Baltic States) into Russia and three Western Newly Independent Sta-
tes – WNIS (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus). That distinction is reasonable: in 
terms of location, population and size, the latter three countries are unmi-
stakably European countries, while Russia is a country-continent. 
The post-Soviet space (excluding the Baltic States) has until now been 
regarded as rather homogenous by the EU, with assistance programmes 
such as Tacis designed for the entire CIS plus Mongolia. The idea of a ‘spe-
cial neighbourhood policy’ for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova implies that 
the EU should promote a more differentiated policy towards the CIS. Rela-
tions with Ukraine, for example, should not automatically be placed in the 
context of relations with Russia, as these countries have different strategic 
aims for their relationship with the EU. Likewise, the EU ought not to treat 
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3. Three agendas
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as a homogenous group, because the stan-
ce of each country towards the EU is different. In light of this heterogene-
ity, the EU could be more successful if it customised policies towards each 
of those countries. 
Besides Russia, the position of Southern Mediterranean in the EU ne-
ighbourhood policy should be clearly defined. The Wider Europe Commu-
nication links this area with Eastern Europe (Russia, WNIS). But it is obvio-
us that these two areas are very different and cannot be treated in the same 
way by the EU. The EU needs separate policies towards Eastern Europe on 
the one hand, and Southern Mediterranean on the other. There are two so-
lutions: Southern Mediterranean could be a specific part of ‘European Affa-
irs Policy’ or belong to ‘Global Affairs’ as one of the most important issues.
3.1.2. Prospect of membership 
‘Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that any Europe-
an state may apply to become a member of the European Union. In some 
cases, the issue of prospective membership has already been resolved. Ac-
cession has been ruled out, for example, for the non-European Mediterra-
nean partners. But other cases remain open, such as those European coun-
tries who have clearly expressed their wish to join the EU’. This statement, 
included in the Wider Europe Communication, is a good starting point for 
future discussions on the prospect of membership for Ukraine. 
The new EU members (Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for instance) will 
play a significant role in any debate on the ultimate geographic limits of the 
Union. The Commission clearly encourages such a role: ‘This is a debate in 
which the current candidates must be in a position to play a full role’. The 
proposed EU constitution presents the same position as Article 49 of the Tre-
aty on European Union.
There are no convincing grounds for denying the prospect of member-
ship to Ukraine, given that the prospect has been extended to several other 
European states. Ukraine is a European country. According to the EU Treaty 
and proposed draft of the constitution, the EU is open to any European co-
22
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untry. It follows that, as a matter of principle, Ukraine is a potential member 
of the EU. This should be acknowledged by the EU. It should be emphasised 
that in practical terms, Ukrainian EU membership is at best a long term per-
spective and recent developments have not significantly improved the pro-
spects of being acknowledged as a candidate country by the EU. Undoub-
tedly, there are a number of reasons underlying the EU’s reluctance to ac-
cept Ukraine as a potential member, perhaps mainly the internal situation 
in Ukraine.
The 2004 enlargement is going to put significant strains on the EU’s in-
stitutions, its internal cohesion, and its budget. Further enlargement could 
cause a public opinion backlash. Nevertheless, despite the profound con-
cerns on internal constraints, the list of potential members has been exten-
ded considerably in the last several years.
EU membership defines and underpins ‘Europeaness’ for all but a few Eu-
ropean countries, which choose not to become members. For post-commu-
nist states, the very process of seeking membership in the EU has become 
the impetus for embarking on extensive political, administrative and econo-
mic reforms, despite the enormous costs and difficulties involved.
The EU’s external policies have produced mixed results. But as a rule, 
the progress of transformation has been faster in those former communist 
bloc countries that have been offered the prospect of membership. The qu-
estion of cause and effect is highly pertinent here because these countries 
may have embarked on reforms with similar determination without the pro-
spect of membership. Nevertheless, it is evident that the EU has sought to 
ensure that any state eligible for membership is indeed ready for it, as re-
flected in the greater level of assistance to, and a more detailed blueprint 
for reforms for the accession countries. This is particularly evident when the 
policy for the Western Balkan countries is compared and contrasted with 
that for the WNIS. 
On the one hand, enlargement is being widely viewed as the most ef-
fective foreign policy tool and actively used to promote reforms in East-Cen-
tral Europe. On the other hand, this instrument is denied to some Europe-
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3. Three agendas
an countries, like Ukraine, on the grounds that they have not implemen-
ted reforms.
3.1.3. The need for a new legal framework
The PCA is outdated
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) provides the cur-
rent legal basis for EU-Ukrainian relations. The PCA was signed in June 1994, 
and entered into force in March 1998. The agreement is to be in force for 
ten years (i.e. until March 2008), and can from then on be renewed on an 
annual basis. 
The PCA has not yet been fully implemented, which is presented by the 
EU as the principal argument against the creation of a new contractual ba-
sis for EU-Ukrainian relations. But most of the provisions of the PCA are so 
vague as to make this virtually meaningless. Additionally, there are several 
arguments in favour of a new legal framework for EU-Ukrainian relations. 
First, both the EU and Ukraine have significantly raised their ambitions 
concerning the eventual scope and depth of integration since the PCA was 
negotiated in the early 1990s. Since 1998, Ukraine has had EU membership 
as a strategic aim, whereas the EU aims to upgrade its relationship with Ukra-
ine within the context of its new Neighbourhood Policy. 
Secondly, the PCA was negotiated on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which was signed in early 1992 and entered into force in autumn 1993. In-
tegration within the EU has progressed significantly since then, through the 
enactment of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 2001 and the Treaty of Nice in 2003. 
Most notable are the strengthening of EU competencies in the field of justi-
ce and home affairs and in foreign, security and defence policy.
Thirdly, EU-Ukraine co-operation increasingly takes place beyond what 
was envisaged in the PCA; this is reflected by the emerging agenda. Whe-
reas the PCA focuses mainly on economic issues, in practice the relation-
ship is becoming much more comprehensive, with co-operation gradual-
ly, and in a somewhat ad hoc manner, progressing in areas not covered by 
the PCA. So far, this is most noticeable in the field of justice and home affa-
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irs, although the two sides agree that there is considerable potential for en-
hanced co-operation also on foreign, security and defence policy, which is 
largely absent in the PCA. 
In conclusion, the PCA is outdated, and a new legal framework is needed 
to manage EU-Ukrainian relations.
The need for a new agreement
The possibility of entering into new Neighbourhood Agre-
ements is one of the key proposals of the Wider Europe Communi-
cation. The scope of these is to be examined after existing contrac-
tual agreements have been fully implemented. It is emphasised that 
these ‘should not override the existing framework for EU relations’ 
with the partner countries, and ‘would supplement existing contractual re-
lations where the EU and the neighbouring country have moved beyond 
the existing framework, taking on new entitlements and obligations’. The-
se will initially be considered for countries whose co-operation with the 
EU has extended the furthest beyond the confines of existing agreements. 
The Communication implies, but does not explicitly state, that Ukraine is a 
strong first candidate to conclude a Neighbourhood Agreement. But consi-
dering the limited progress on PCA implementation, this is (at best) likely 
to occur in the medium-term.
The Wider Europe initiative will be further developed through the elabo-
ration of bilateral Action Plans, as suggested by the Commission’s Communi-
cation. Work on such Action Plans have been initiated and are to be comple-
ted in spring 2004, presumably including proposals for new Neighbourhood 
Agreements supplementing the PCA and other previous agreements.
Considering the nature and scope of any new agreement, it is likely to 
take several years to negotiate and ratify. Similarly, extensive agreements 
between the EU and third countries take an average of four years to com-
plete – from the beginning of negotiations to its enactment. In the case of 
the PCA with Ukraine, this process took more than five years. As the PCA 
expires in little more than four years, it is high time to consider the future 
of the PCA. Combined with Wider Europe proposals, this will entail the pa-
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rallel development of a ‘new’ PCA and supplementary Neighbourhood Agre-
ements (to be negotiated from 2004 onwards). This plan for the develop-
ment of parallel structures seems unnecessarily complex, considering that 
one of the principal aims of the Convention and the proposed new EU con-
stitution is to simplify the EU system of governance. A better solution wo-
uld be to merge the two processes and establish one new comprehensive 
agreement. If agreement is reached in areas not covered by the PCA befo-
re a new framework agreement is in place, interim agreements can be re-
ached and later incorporated into a new comprehensive agreement sup-
planting the current PCA.
Institutional architecture
The institutional framework of almost all of the other (mainly associa-
tion) agreements mentioned above are similar to that of the PCA; consisting 
of a ministerial council, a committee of senior officials assisted by a number 
of sub-committees of experts and a joint parliamentary committee. Few of 
the other agreements entail such high-level political dialogue as that accor-
ded to Ukraine through the annual EU-Ukraine summits.  
In the case of candidate states, supplementary mechanisms were esta-
blished as part of the reinforced accession strategy through the creation of 
‘structured dialogue’, which was later expanded to include other candida-
te states, and was given a more institutionalised structure through the cre-
ation of the European Conference in 1997. 
With the prospect of enhanced EU-Ukraine co-operation, changes to the 
current PCA structure should be considered. With the prospect of the pro-
gressive integration of Ukraine, much of the additional co-operation is like-
ly to focus on more technical issues, such as the adoption and implementa-
tion of the acquis in Ukraine, and its participation in EU programmes. With 
the current institutional structure, with relatively limited structured co-ope-
ration at lower levels, this new agenda runs the danger of creating conge-
stion at higher levels. Summits and other high-level meetings are unneces-
sarily preoccupied with minor issues and technicalities that could and sho-
uld be resolved at lower levels.
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A new institutional structure should thus include more extensive con-
tacts at lower levels. Considering the growing priority of legislative approxi-
mation and regulatory convergence, more extensive links between the Ukra-
inian parliament and EU parliamentarians, both at the European and the na-
tional level, should also be considered. 
3.1.4. Step-by-step inclusion of Ukraine in EU policies
The process of the gradual inclusion of third countries in EU policies is 
well known from previous and current enlargement processes, as well as the 
integration between the EU and a number of non-candidate countries. 
In economics, integration is seen as progressing in certain distinct sta-
ges, from 1) free trade in goods, to 2) customs union, to 3) an internal com-
modity market, to 4) a complete internal market and finally to 5) economic 
and monetary union. While generally following these phases, the specific 
sequencing of the process in the case of the EU’s relations with its associa-
tes takes different forms.
Further, the degree of integration does not seem to depend upon the 
long-term goals for the relationship. Although the ultimate aim for candi-
date states is the most far-reaching among the EU associates, the Europe 
Agreements between the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Euro-
pe provide for less integration in the short and medium-term than the agre-
ements between the EU and the non-candidate EFTA countries. The gene-
ral principle seems to be that candidates for EU membership are required 
to gradually adopt EU rules before accession and be in full compliance by 
the date of entry. However, implementation of the ‘four freedoms’ (the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital), EU competition and sta-
te aid policy as well as flanking measures, are to be completed several years 
after their accession to the EU. 
EU agreements with countries going through the process of transition is 
a multistage process, with rather limited commitments on the date of enact-
ment, and more ambitious aims to be achieved progressively and over the 
long-term. For the East-Central European accession candidates, adoption of 
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the acquis (which proved to be one of the most time-consuming tasks of the 
Europe Agreements) has been progressively pursued after the entry into for-
ce of the agreements. A typical example is the aim of establishing a free tra-
de area or a customs union with an explicit timetable for its achievement, in 
contrast to the EU-Ukraine free trade area envisaged in the PCA. 
In the case of the agreements with the EFTA countries, most of the acqu-
is was adopted before and during negotiations. The ultimate aim of the 
agreements is essentially reached upon its entry into force, with only minor 
exceptions and limited transition periods. The extent of EU integration and 
the ‘completion’ of the Single Market thus limit progress in further integra-
tion and the development of relations with the EU. In other words, unlike in 
other association agreements, it is not dependent primarily upon progress 
on domestic reform in the associated country. 
The ‘candidate’ model of step-by-step integration is clearly most appro-
priate for Ukraine. One could envisage a process of ‘regulatory convergence 
and approximation of legislation’ with limited and gradual introduction of 
the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour between the EU and 
Ukraine. To a certain extent, such a process represents a continuation of the 
process Ukraine is currently pursuing as a result of the PCA and its aspirations 
to join the WTO, with Ukraine agreeing to the fundamentally asymmetric ‘ac-
cession candidate principle’; to join a club one must abide by its rules.
While the stages of integration and the gradual inclusion of Ukraine in 
EU policies is so far spelt out most clearly in the field of economics, similar 
models should also be developed in other areas. The EU has, for instance, 
made detailed arrangements for the participation of non-EU member sta-
tes in the ESDP, primarily aimed at non-EU NATO member states and EU ac-
cession candidates, which should be extended to Ukraine. 
In the field of JHA, a similar step-by-step approach could be specified con-
cerning the movement of persons. In the case of Ukraine, a first stage could 
consist of facilitating travel while maintaining visa requirements. In the se-
cond stage, visa requirements would be lifted, with Ukraine’s eventual as-
sociation with the Schengen regime in the third stage.
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3.1.5. Participation in the EU institutions
A much more controversial issue than the gradual inclusion of Ukraine 
in EU policies is the extent to which this is accompanied by Ukraine’s parti-
cipation in EU institutions. EU leaders, such as Commission President Roma-
no Prodi, have frequently invoked the phrase ‘everything but institutions’ 
to describe the desired relationship between the EU and its new neighbo-
urs. The Wider Europe proposals reiterate this position, stating that the me-
dium-term goal of the new Neighbourhood Policy is ‘not... to include a per-
spective of membership or a role in the Union’s institutions’.
However, many of the EU association arrangements entail the participa-
tion of representatives of the associated state in EU institutions. The most 
extensive participation by non-EU representatives are found in the numero-
us EU programmes, for instance the Framework Programmes for research 
and development and educational programmes such as Socrates. Through 
the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the EFTA EEA states partici-
pate in more than thirty such programmes, and a supplementary feature of 
the accession process has been the gradual participation of candidate sta-
tes in these programmes. The Wider Europe Communication envisages in-
creased participation in EU programmes and expansion of programmes for 
the countries covered by the new EU Neighbours Policy, for instance through 
an opening of the European Research Area now being established. Ukraine 
should of course be a prime target of this expansion.
There are a growing number of EU autonomous agencies such as the Eu-
ropean Environmental Agency, Europol and the European Food Safety Autho-
rity. EU associates also participate in some of these programmes, with their 
status ranging from full member via ‘associate’ to observer. Similar arrange-
ments should be considered for the inclusion of Ukraine in these agencies. 
Some EU associates have also been accorded the opportunity to partici-
pate in ‘decision-shaping’ in the EU. The most notable example of this is the 
participation of representatives of thirteen non-EU member states – candidate 
states – in the Convention elaborating a constitution for the EU. The EFTA EEA 
states participate in more than two hundred of the committees assisting the 
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Commission in preparing new EU legislation through the EEA agreement, in-
creasingly also open to accession states. Ukrainian experts and officials sho-
uld be allowed similar access in areas of enhanced EU-Ukraine relations, fol-
lowing the gradual step-by-step integration of Ukraine in EU policies.
3.1.6. A new approach to financial assistance 
Fundamental change of EU assistance policy towards new eastern ne-
ighbours including Ukraine is indispensable. There are strong arguments 
– the size and proximity of Ukraine to the EU; the relative poverty of Ukra-
ine vis-à-vis the EU; and the precariousness of positive political, economic 
and societal developments in the country – in favour of increasing EU eco-
nomic and financial assistance to Ukraine. 
Current assistance programmes
To date, EU economic assistance to Ukraine has been channelled prima-
rily through the Tacis programme. The distinctions between the assistance 
offered through this programme with that provided through analogous pro-
grammes to EU accession candidates on Ukraine’s western border (Phare, 
ISPA and SAPARD programmes) are very marked, clearly reflecting the prio-
rity accorded to the enlargement process. 
There are large differences in terms of the amounts of financial assi-
stance provided. In the 2000–2006 financial perspective, the enlargement 
candidates will receive almost 1200 Euro/capita from the EU budget, whi-
le Ukraine and the other CIS countries will receive only 13 Euro/capita. In 
2002, the EU projected 77 million Euros in assistance to Ukraine, which ac-
counts for less than 2% of the EU’s external actions budget, excluding aid 
to accession candidates. Compared with the previous budget, Ukraine and 
the other CIS countries saw their share of economic assistance drop slightly 
in the 2000–2006 EU financial perspective, primarily due to increases in aid 
to the Balkans. Although this allocation is slowly reducing the economic di-
sparities between the candidates and the EU, it also contributes to widening 
the socio-economic gap between Ukraine and candidate countries. Howe-
ver, considering the inflexibility of the EU budget and the massive demands 
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placed on it due to the next enlargement, unless Ukraine is acknowledged 
as a potential EU membership candidate and thus eligible for enlargement 
funds, EU assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to increase within the current fi-
nancial perspective (2000–2006).
The different groups of programmes also provide different types of assi-
stance. Whereas candidates receive substantial investment support, the Ta-
cis programme provides mainly technical assistance to Ukraine, although the 
share for investment support was increased in the current Tacis regulation. 
Financial and technical assistance to EU candidate countries aims to prepa-
re them for membership and is specifically targeted towards enhancing the-
ir ability to implement EU acquis. The Tacis programme, by contrast, consists 
mainly of generic programmes and projects for the transition to market-ba-
sed democracies similar to the assistance provided by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Although Tacis is frequently criticised, it should be emphasised that the 
programme has brought tangible benefits to Ukraine, with the nuclear sa-
fety programme representing a notable success story. However, Ukraine’s 
new status as a direct neighbour of the EU, combined with the prospect of 
an upgraded relationship with the EU, entails different challenges for which 
the current Tacis approach is less than suitable.
New types of assistance
The limits of the Tacis programme are recognised by the European Com-
mission. A New Neighbourhood Instrument has been proposed in connec-
tion with the Wider Europe initiative and further elaborated on in the Com-
munication: ‘Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’. But this 
proposal should be seen only as a first step towards a final solution. 
Unfortunately, the New Neighbourhood Instrument is designed almost 
exclusively for border areas of new EU neighbours. Since negative effects 
of EU enlargement will be more strongly felt in western Ukraine, great em-
phasis should therefore be placed on cross-border projects in western Ukra-
ine, creating a bridgehead for safe investment activity there. In light of the 
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long common border between Ukraine and the enlarged EU, and conside-
ring the growing importance of JHA within the EU, JHA should become a 
more central part of EU economic assistance to Ukraine. But EU assistance 
in the field of cross-border co-operation should be seen as only one com-
ponent of the EU assistance framework for Ukraine. In the case of countries 
such as Ukraine, a new assistance programme should cover the country as 
a whole. The upgraded EU-Ukrainian relationship could benefit from assi-
stance programmes targeted towards challenges more specifically linked to 
the process of European integration and the EU, leaving other sources such 
as the IFIs to provide more generic transition assistance. Increased EU assi-
stance should for instance focus more on aiding Ukraine in bringing its laws 
in line with the EU acquis, as suggested in the Wider Europe Communica-
tion. A new assistance programme specifically targeted to Ukraine based on 
the Phare and ISPA programmes of assistance to candidate countries should 
constitute the core of EU assistance policy towards Ukraine. In particular, as-
sistance should support the new agreement (see section ‘Needs for the new 
legal framework’), the way that Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) does for the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreements in the Western Balkans. 
Investment-oriented assistance, similar to Phare and ISPA programmes, 
is indispensable because in its Wider Europe Communication the Europe-
an Commission has offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Mar-
ket as well as further integration and liberalisation in order to promote the 
free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (i.e. ‘four freedoms’). 
Ukraine cannot participate in ‘four freedoms’ without upgrading its infra-
structure – therefore, EU assistance in this field is needed. 
This kind of assistance could help in promoting good governance, one 
of the most important problems in Ukraine. EU assistance, similar to Phare 
and ISPA programmes, would need transparency, which very frequently do-
esn’t currently exist in public life in Ukraine. Investment-oriented assistan-
ce needs real co-operation between EU and Ukrainian bureaucracy, which 
can be more fruitful than training under Tacis projects. Finally, such assistan-
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ce needs engagement of Ukrainian public funds, what can help in better al-
locating public financial resources. Investment-oriented assistance in tho-
se sectors crucial for ordinary people (infrastructure – roads and rails, drin-
king-water supplies, treatment of wastewater) could play a significant role 
in the creation of a positive image of the EU in Ukraine.
As far as the EU’s priorities are concerned, and although a shift towards 
more investment support may be desirable, institution and capacity building 
remains an important challenge for Ukraine, and one which requires main-
ly technical assistance. The development of civil society in Ukraine is crucial 
for the realisation of Ukraine’s ‘European choice’; therefore the EU should 
support that process. Assistance could originate both from the EU and par-
ticular member states’ funds. It would also be advisable to assure as much 
involvement as possible from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from 
EU member states in the implementation of projects in Ukraine.
The EU should better co-ordinate its effort towards Ukraine. One option 
that would increase assistance but leave the EU budget alone, which is espe-
cially important in the period 2004–2006, would be to allow the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s financing arm, to extend its operations to 
Ukraine, as mentioned in the Wider Europe Communication. Furthermore, 
the fragmented system of EU assistance, whereby more than half is provi-
ded bilaterally by the EU member states and through various IFIs, entails 
problems of duplication and co-ordination, and limits the potential politi-
cal impact of such assistance. The Commission and member countries sho-
uld be in continuous contact regarding assistance to Ukraine. 
3.2. Ukraine’s agenda for the EU
3.2.1. The need for a clear strategy towards the EU
To date, Ukraine has failed to develop a clear strategy towards the EU. 
In many respects its policies seem to consist mainly of declarations that are 
insufficiently co-ordinated between institutions. Being mostly limited to fo-
reign policy declarations, Ukraine’s pro-European aspirations have made lit-
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tle impact on the domestic policy agenda. Lacking a positive domestic re-
form record, Ukraine has lost much credibility in the EU. Moreover, Ukraine-
’s simultaneous policies towards Russia/CIS seem to contradict its strategy 
vis-à-vis the EU. 
Homework as a first step
Ukraine needs a clear strategy towards the EU based on an understan-
ding of the nature, dynamics and prerequisites of European integration. In 
order to give substance to its pro-European aspirations, the Ukrainian po-
litical elites need to move beyond their exclusive focus on security bene-
fits. In relations with the EU, the preoccupation with geopolitics has proven 
misplaced and has marred Ukraine’s priorities vis-à-vis the EU. Since inde-
pendence, the Ukrainian elites have highlighted Ukraine’s ‘geopolitical si-
gnificance’ to the West and have been complacent believing that Ukraine 
was simply ‘too important to fail’. Ukraine shows a limited understanding 
of the fact that the EU is a community of values joined by shared commit-
ments and solidarity – and misunderstands the fact that EU membership is 
not just about rights and entitlements but also about common values and 
credible commitments. Ukrainian political elites have to fully realise and ac-
cept that for the EU-Ukraine’s democratic development and economic per-
formance matter more than its geopolitical import, even though the latter 
cannot be disregarded.
Ultimately, commitment to European integration depends on the progress 
of domestic Europeanisation. Therefore, to give credibility to its intentions, 
European integration needs to become a domestic priority in Ukraine. Ukra-
ine’s domestic reforms, which have largely floundered, need to be re-invigo-
rated. A clear commitment by the Ukrainian political class to the ideals espo-
used by the EU – democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights 
– needs to be demonstrated. Moreover, the incomplete record of economic 
reforms, recent economic growth notwithstanding, still casts doubt on Ky-
iv’s commitment to a functioning market economy. The ‘European choice’, 
which has been of limited interest to Ukrainian politicians and bureaucracy, 
needs to become the mantra spurring domestic change. As demonstrated by 
3. Three agendas
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reforms undertaken by East-Central Europe countries in anticipation of EU 
accession, European integration requires extensive institutional and policy 
reform at the domestic level. European integration is primarily a challenge 
for domestic policy making. Furthermore, it needs to be recognised as such 
by the Ukrainian public at large. It is thus necessary to elaborate a strategy 
on informing society about the process of European integration.
Ukrainian officials should avoid making conflicting pronouncements on 
their goals vis-à-vis the EU. Such pronouncements result from competition 
between the bodies involved in European integration, such as the Ministry of 
Economy and European Integration (MEEI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), evidenced by their conflicting reactions to the New Neighbourhood/
Wider Europe initiatives in the spring of 2003. 
Such statements should also be tempered by a realistic assessment of 
what can be achieved, backed up not only by domestic reform, but also by 
an explicit willingness to compromise. Demands for benefits from the EU, 
for instance for asymmetric trade concessions, should be balanced by simi-
lar Ukrainian concessions in other areas, for example through the removal 
of visas for EU citizens while such requirements remain in place for Ukra-
inian citizens travelling to the EU.
The ‘Direct Approach’ to the EU
If Ukraine is committed to European integration, a ‘direct approach’ to 
the EU is the only feasible strategy. Driven by their private interests, some 
business circles in Ukraine favour closer economic ties with Russia and ad-
vocate going ‘to Europe together with Russia’. As a result, Ukraine’s integra-
tion with the EU is linked to an increase in Russia’s economic co-operation 
with the EU. While ensuring good relations with neighbouring countries is 
a pre-condition for closer relations with the EU, explicitly linking Ukraine’s 
progress to that of Russia undermines the credibility of Kyiv’s ‘European cho-
ice’. Indeed, participation in a ‘Common Economic Space’ (CES) with Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan would be incompatible with EU member-
ship were plans to establish a customs union be implemented. In contrast 
to Ukraine, Russia has not declared its intention of joining the EU and is in-
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terested only in selected sectoral co-operation, such as trade, energy and 
security. The latter is clearly a narrower set of objectives than Ukraine’s in-
tention of becoming a fully-fledged member. Therefore, the strategy captu-
red by the slogan ‘to Europe together with Russia’ reflects an important qu-
alification to Kyiv’s policy towards the EU, implying that it is Russia’s policy 
towards the EU and its desire for closer ties that will set the pace and scope 
of Ukraine’s integration with ‘Europe’. The pursuit of this strategy undermi-
nes Ukraine’s strategic objective.
Undoubtedly, Ukraine has an interest in the further liberalisation of fore-
ign economic ties with other CIS member states (the agreement on the CES 
represents the most recent attempt in this direction). But only insofar as it 
does not jeopardise the prospect of integration with the EU, which – in the 
long-term – is Ukraine’s way out of the current deadlock of stalled reforms 
towards greater political stability and economic prosperity. The achievement 
of this goal depends on Ukraine’s determination to integrate with the EU ra-
ther than simply becoming an addendum to Russia’s relations with the EU.
At the same time, a ‘direct way’ to the EU is not an anti-Russian policy. 
Rather, given the diverse objectives expressed by Ukraine and Russia vis-à-vis 
the EU, their respective strategies have to be pursued separately. This sho-
uld not be seen as a ‘zero-sum game’: being pro-EU does not mean being 
anti-Russia, as both seek closer relations with the EU. It is in Ukraine’s inte-
rest to take advantage of opportunities for enhanced regional-level co-ope-
ration, depending on the balance of costs and benefits and opportunities 
arising, rather than seeing the option in terms of ‘either-or’ between Rus-
sia and the EU.
Ukraine’s integration with the EU does not rule out the deepening of 
economic co-operation between Ukraine and Russia, as long as they adhere 
to the transparent and recognised principles of international trade (i.e. the 
WTO principles). Nevertheless, it should also be recognised by Ukrainian de-
cision-makers that diverting scarce resources, away from the task of EU inte-
gration, to the setting up of a free trade zone within the CIS area casts doubt 
onto Ukraine’s intentions. Given that Ukraine has a long way to go to prove 
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its commitment to the EU, any simultaneous commitment within the CIS area 
weakens its case vis-à-vis the EU in the capitals of the member states.
To date, Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with the EU have been limited to 
foreign policy declarations. However, in order to lend credibility to Ukraine’s 
European vocation, these declarations need to be bolstered by a detailed pro-
gramme of domestic reforms. It is important to emphasise that such reforms 
should not be considered as diplomatic concessions to the EU, but as essen-
tial requirements for Ukraine’s transition to a modern European state. The 
following sections focus therefore mainly on domestic Ukrainian issues.
3.2.2. Political reform
The objective aim of political reform is to increase the legitimacy of po-
wer. The very idea of political reform cannot be limited to constitutional chan-
ges since broader changes are needed, for example the role of political par-
ties needs to be strengthened.
The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution was a result of a compromise between 
the president and the parliament (Verkhovna Rada). The president appoints 
the prime minister with the consent of the parliament. The parliament can 
also influence the government by rejecting the government’s general stra-
tegy, or by voting down the government in a no-confidence vote. However, 
the appointment of ministers does not formally demand the consent of par-
liament and, consequently, does not reflect the clearly identified parliamen-
tary majority. Moreover, the president may dismiss the prime minister wi-
thout parliamentary approval. Thus, the president exercises control over the 
government, but avoids responsibility (the government tends to be blamed 
for policy mistakes). This situation makes the governmental system unsta-
ble and ineffective. As a result, interactions between the branches of power 
and within the parliament, as well as the political decision-making process, 
often lack transparency, accountability and predictability. The corollary of 
this situation has been the domination by the executive and a highly asym-
metrical distribution of political power, something which renders constitu-
tional ‘checks and balances’ ineffective. 
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At the same time, as the parliament is not sufficiently structured along 
party lines, there is a danger that a shift to the parliamentary model would 
not, at least in the short-term, result in a stable government. It seems that 
the Ukrainian system can be more easily adjusted to resemble the French 
mixed systems through the formation of a coalition government based on 
parliamentary majority and by increasing the parliament’s responsibilities 
and real powers. 
It is understandable that benefits and disadvantages of any amendments 
to the Constitution have to be carefully weighed, regardless of the expedien-
cies of the electoral cycle. It has to be stressed that any attempts to postpo-
ne the 2004 presidential and the 2006 parliamentary elections entail viola-
ting the Constitution with serious repercussions for Ukraine’s international 
standing in general and aspirations vis-à-vis the EU in particular.  
There is a possibility of compromise between the major political parties 
over the most important constitutional change: on the formation of a go-
vernment based on parliamentary majority, which can only be removed by 
a ‘constructive vote of no-confidence’ with the simultaneous appointment 
of a new prime minister.
Other important changes might include the following: 
• appointments and dismissals of members of the government or he-
ads of other central executive bodies should only be done by consent 
of the prime minister (thus, the ‘vertical’ of executive power would re-
main in force); 
• the president might have the right to appoint the ministers of defen-
ce, foreign affairs, domestic affairs and emergency situations, but with 
the consent of the prime minister. Otherwise, the government loses its 
integrity, and incentives for coalition building will be lessened (as the-
se positions are attractive for coalition partners). 
At the same time, the president may have the right to dismiss parliament 
and to set new elections, if a government is not formed within a certain pe-
riod (30–60 days); The formation of a new government should be connec-
ted not to the election of a new president, but to the election of a new par-
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liament; The president may dismiss the Prosecutor General only with the 
consent of parliament.
A crucial element of reform is the development of strong parties and par-
liamentary caucuses. Therefore, financial support to parties represented in 
parliament may be provided. In European democracies there are different ty-
pes of electoral systems. The present Ukrainian mixed system was introduced 
on the eve of the 1998 election and it was a clear step forward (as the pre-
vious strict-majority system favoured the non-affiliated post-communist no-
menklatura). Nevertheless, election results in single-mandate districts are still 
more open to administrative interference than elections on party lists. Thus, 
it seems that in Ukrainian conditions the next logical step towards a parlia-
ment structured along party lines is the adoption of a proportional electo-
ral system. One of the options would be to introduce a proportional system 
with regional lists. However, in this case, the existing threshold (4%) should 
be applied to the results of a party in the whole of the country.
The package of new laws, important for the adoption of political re-
forms, include laws on parliamentary procedures, on the Cabinet of Mini-
sters, on the presidency, amendments to the laws on local state administra-
tions, on the Central Electoral Committee. Also, since there is no law on im-
peachment of the president, it is almost impossible to realise this constitu-
tional provision. Legal definitions of the status and functions of the presi-
dential administration (president’s staff) are also absent, these provisions 
may be included in the new law on the presidency. In general, rights of the 
bodies created by the president, the prime minister and ministries, and by 
parliament must be clearly defined by law and strictly observed. It is like-
wise important to restore the political neutrality of the head of the Natio-
nal Bank of Ukraine (NBU), which needs to be manifestly independent from 
other branches of power. 
3.2.3. Public administration reform
Public administration reform has been declared a primary task of the Ukra-
inian authorities since the first years of Ukrainian independence. In 1998, 
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a commission appointed by President Leonid Kuchma prepared the ‘Concept 
for Administrative Reform’. Yet, one of the Concept’s main provisions – the 
adoption of laws that regulate public administration – has been only par-
tially implemented. Without an adequate legislative framework, the pace 
of administrative reform in Ukraine largely depends on the political motives 
of the president rather than on the logical merits of the Concept. For exam-
ple, the draft law on the Cabinet of Ministers has been vetoed by the presi-
dent seven times since 1997, and returned to parliament for consideration. 
Although the ‘Concept for Administrative Reform’ is in many aspects outda-
ted, after some revisions it could still serve as a blueprint for reform.
Decreasing of political influences
To minimise political influences in administrative reform, as well as to 
add a systemic character to the reform, it is advisable that the aforemen-
tioned laws, which are yet to be adopted, should include the following re-
gulations:
• procedures for the role of parliamentary factions in the appointment 
of ministers (until the constitution is amended to allow for parliamen-
tary endorsement of ministers);
• structure and procedures for the creation of executive bodies, inclu-
ding ministries, agencies and state committees;
• procedures for co-operation between the cabinet and advisory bodies 
under the president, including safeguards against the excessive influ-
ence of the latter in the work of the former;
•  regulations on administrative justice (the structure of courts, provi-
sions for their independence, rules and procedures of the administra-
tive process);
•  upgrade of the status and elaboration of procedures of the Central Ad-
ministration for Civil Service as a controlling agency within the execu-
tive branch that would have supervisory powers over both the lawful-
ness of activities of servicemen and protection of their rights; 
•  procedures for the competition to the civil service, to ensure it is con-
test-based and merit-based employment;
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•  procedures for monitoring, prevention and fighting against corrup-
tion, strict legal formulations and their enforcement (e.g. mandatory 
tax declarations by entire families of those holding top governmen-
tal posts), and co-operation with civil society organisations in the fi-
ght against corruption.
To ensure the systemic implementation of laws, it would be advisable to 
create a ministerial position in charge of administrative reform, following 
the example of Central and Eastern European states. 
Reform of local government
On its accession to the Council of Europe in 1995, Ukraine undertook 
the obligation to ratify and implement the 1985 European Charter on Lo-
cal Self-Government. Despite the fact that the law on local self-government 
was enacted in 1997, and was followed by the law on state administration 
(1999), the system suffers from a number of shortcomings. There is overlap 
and lack of clarity between the functions of appointed and elected bodies. 
At the regional and local levels, state administration (subordinated to the 
president) tends to overshadow local self-government bodies and undermi-
ne the principle of local government in Ukraine. State administration sho-
uld be limited to the regional (oblast) level, whereas the local level (rayons) 
should be fully self-governing.
The administrative structure of Ukraine is quite outdated (founded on the 
Soviet party-based division), so local communities, rayons and oblasts can-
not accumulate sufficient resources and suffer from excessive centralisation 
of public functions. The regions and/or districts should be enlarged, which 
would consequently reduce their number. In this case, changes to constitu-
tion should be approved. While there are different schemes with different 
arguments, it is understandable that the main aim is to increase the compe-
tencies of regions and districts.
The constitution granted the rayon and oblast branches of the state ad-
ministration the unusual competency of drafting the budgets of their areas, 
and implementing them after the endorsement by respective councils. Such 
a provision made the state administration the core bodies in their areas, thus 
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diminishing the role of self-government and placing the state in control of 
local matters. The main taxes are collected and distributed through the cen-
tral budget, which causes delays and breeds corruption. This system also di-
scourages municipalities, rayons and oblasts from searching for more effec-
tive fund-raising methods. The situation was somewhat improved in 2001, 
when the new Budget Code provided for automatic (direct) distribution of 
personal income tax and some duties to the local budgets. 
It would be advisable to deprive state administrations of budgetary com-
petencies, instead transferring these to the executive committees of rayon 
and oblast councils. The state administration should monitor the adheren-
ce to law, co-ordinate the implementation of nation-wide programs in the-
ir territories and co-ordinate the elaboration of regional development pro-
grams. Thus, the local government and state bodies would divide compe-
tencies more logically. Unfortunately, the main proposals for political and 
constitutional reform, put forward in Ukraine by fall 2003 (both presidential 
and parliamentary), do not include such provisions. It is important to adopt 
laws that: clearly divide state and municipal lands; define procedures for the 
creation and activity of communal enterprises; regulate state land cadastre; 
regulate administrative services and social services and provide a basis for 
increasing local competencies and control over budgets. 
In sum, the precise competencies of local government and state bodies 
are not clearly divided, which generates conflict. Thus, it is necessary to di-
vide the spheres of responsibility more precisely, especially where budge-
tary matters are concerned, property management, and other areas where 
administrative competencies of local self-government and local administra-
tions contradict each other.  
3.2.4. Economic reforms
Ukraine, benefiting from favourable economic conditions, and having 
good prospects for 2004, should proceed with a set of economic reforms. 
The steps that should be undertaken in order to deepen integration with 
the EU countries in the context of economic reforms are ones that support 
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stable economic development, with the emphasis on continued efforts to-
wards joining the WTO.
Ukraine’s economic recovery of the last few years derived from earlier 
reforms. Although the post-1998 revival of economic activity was possible 
due to a combination of factors, some of them having a temporary charac-
ter, the wise policy steps also started to bring results in 2000. Appropriate 
steps were taken in privatisation, deregulation, hardening budget constra-
ints and good co-ordination of macroeconomic policies. The introduction 
of simplified taxation – responsible for moving part of unregistered econo-
mic activity to the official sector – was another example of beneficial reform. 
The effects demonstrated themselves in high rates of growth, low inflation, 
re-monetisation of the economy and increased confidence in the domestic 
currency and in the economic policies of the government in general.
During 2003, some positive developments in the field of economic po-
licy – such as corporate tax reform and the introduction of a low, flat base 
Corporate Income Tax rate of 13%, as well as lowering of the base Value Ad-
ded Tax (VAT) rate – took place. The continued efforts to join the WTO are 
also worth noting.
Further steps
To ensure that the current economic growth is sustained, further steps 
are needed. Ukraine should continue its efforts toward ensuring macroeco-
nomic stability, contract enforcement, and adherence to international stan-
dards in trade and capital regulations. Economic development should be 
supported by moves in the two ways. The first consists of measures that in-
fluence the overall economic climate in the country and have longer-term 
perspectives, while the second refers to better managed macro-economic 
policies. Thus, it is proposed that the following steps should receive priori-
ty on the reform agenda:
• Fiscal policies: the first is the elimination of numerous tax preferen-
ces, especially under VAT, and the removal of accumulated VAT arrears. The 
arrears undermine tax obedience, exports and general perceptions of the 
rule of law. Also, there is a need for social sector reform, and this can only 
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be done if – together with Personal Income Tax rate reduction – the taxable 
base is broadened. This should be a short-term priority.
• The energy sector needs special attention as it has accumulated signi-
ficant amounts of tax and payment arrears and is a source of large ineffi-
ciencies. Despite the fact that cash payments increased to a level of 100%, 
the sector managed to build up a stock of debts toward suppliers. The pri-
vatisation process should be advanced in the energy sector. According to the 
last IMF Country Report estimate, Ukraine’s stock of debts and arrears ge-
nerated by state-owned energy companies is at 12% of GDP. This issue also 
requires immediate attention. 
• There is a need for strengthening supervision within the banking sec-
tor, as it remains fragile; the share of non-performing loans is relatively high, 
and the authorities are unwilling to close banks that do not meet prudential 
regulations. If steps in this direction are not undertaken, further credit expan-
sion – needed to support growth and further re-monetisation – cannot be 
sustained. The most critical problems of the banking sector at the moment 
that need to be addressed in the short and middle-term are the following:
–  lack of power of regulatory authorities to discipline large and/or poli-
tically connected banks;
– low accountability of supervisors;
–  heavy reliance on supervision while relevant information is not fully 
available to the public;
– poor protection of creditor rights and no current mortgage law;
–  banks are vulnerable to demand shocks as 40% of their resources are 
short-term deposits; 
–  the central bank is the only source of liquid funds in the case of a short-
term fluctuation in cash flow.
• Privatisation should be continued in a transparent manner. This sho-
uld be considered as both a short and medium-term goal. As has already 
been made apparent in the data, private manufacturing firms outperform 
state-owned ones in Ukraine. Moreover, the presence of foreign direct in-
vestors brings desirable managerial practices, improves overall investment 
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climate and allows financing of budget deficits. In spite of booming econo-
mic activity, the investment climate in Ukraine is still perceived as unfavo-
urable, as shown by increasing capital flight from the country. So for this re-
ason, it is critical to work on its improvement. It is likewise important as the 
recent privatisation plans have not been met, and the external demand for 
Ukrainian plants looks weak. 
• A long-term strategy for the agricultural sector should be developed. 
Although land reform has clearly yielded some positive results, the greatest 
impact remains to be seen. It looks that the best time to reform agriculture 
– two years of good harvest – are partly lost. It is still unclear whether the 
sector will be able to repay the credits received in 2002–2003. The policy to-
wards this sector over 1999–2002 cannot be considered a fundamental re-
form effort, but rather a series of improvised steps. This needs to be chan-
ged if the economy is to profit from agricultural production in which Ukra-
ine possesses a comparative advantage. 
Prudent monetary policies
In terms of macro-economic policy, prudent monetary policies are ne-
eded at present in order to curb inflation. Previous increases of liquidi-
ty in the form of unchecked interventions and lowering of capital requ-
irements for commercial banks – together with subsequent reversal of 
seasonal food price decreases and the rise of the minimum wage – led 
to accelerated inflation in recent months. Consumer prices grew by over 
7% year-on-year in July 2003, and by nearly 6% in August. Given further 
growth of money supply and seasonal trends, it is possible that inflation 
can reach 10% by the end of the year. Inflation thus becomes unstable. 
Suffice it to recall that at the end of 2002 there was a deflation, and in-
flation mounted quickly in a couple of months. The NBU should measure 
inflation more closely by increasing its understanding of monetary trans-
mission mechanisms. It should be remembered that the limited pass-thro-
ugh on prices after the currency crisis of 1998 was a result of good mone-
tary management. As a result, inflation was reduced. Conversely, volati-
le inflation rates are reminiscent of the high and unstable inflation rates 
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of 1993–1995, and thus can threaten reversal of the trends towards con-
fidence in domestic currency. Although the main sources of the July in-
flation figures are not explained by monetary factors, further monetary 
expansion can support its gradual rise. Inflation expectations can be for-
med irrespective of the sources of price rises. In the sphere of exchange 
rate policy, the NBU should proceed as it has declared (i.e. allowing more 
exchange rate flexibility and adopting direct inflation targeting over the 
perspective of a couple of years).
3.2.5. Legal and judiciary reform
A stable and coherent legal system
The legal system should above all be stable and cohesive. Ukrainian laws 
often contain ambiguous provisions, creating uncertainty about their pro-
per implementation. Legal relations, which should be governed by laws, 
are often stipulated in decrees and other normative acts. Taking into acco-
unt the above-mentioned circumstances, citizens are poorly informed about 
their rights and duties. In order to improve the legislative process, the follo-
wing measures are necessary:
•  legislative level rules for drafting and adopting legal acts as well as 
normalising law-making techniques must be codified;
•  staff and financial assistance must be provided for the implemen-
tation process in order to provide for a proper assessment of the 
economic and legal consequences of enforcing legal acts, including 
technical;
•  general and sectored planning for legislation must be developed – in-
cluding  the calculation of expenses on drafting and implementating 
legislation and the inclusion of these costs into the state budget;
•  legislation already enacted must be systematised in order to remove 
inconsistencies and bring the existing legislation into conformity with 
newly-adopted/impending legislation;
•  the foundations of the legal system must be based on laws (many are 
still stipulated only in decrees and other normative acts);
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•  the transposition of certain foreign law institutes into Ukrainian legi-
slation, often without taking into account Ukrainian conditions and 
laws, must be avoided;
•  a unified legal terminology must be adopted for the entire legal sys-
tem. 
Despite some positive trends in judicial and legal reform, many important 
issues are not yet stipulated, and new laws often contradict existing ones. 
The recently adopted law on the judiciary illustrates some of the problems 
of judicial and legal reform in Ukraine. Firstly, the aforementioned law un-
necessarily cancelled the law on commercial courts; consequently, several 
aspects of the commercial courts’ activities are not regulated at all. It will 
therefore be necessary to re-draft and adopt a new law on commercial co-
urts. Secondly, the new law on the judiciary provides for the establishment 
of specialised courts – administrative and others (e.g. juvenile, family, finan-
cial, bankruptcy courts, etc.). It will be necessary to provide legislative and 
material grounds for the activities of these courts. Thirdly, the law on the 
judiciary has a number of inconsistencies. For instance, according to Artic-
le 24, the head of the local court is obliged to undertake certain actions to 
appoint public jurors. At the same time, participation of public jurors is not 
provided for local courts in this law. 
An independent judiciary
In order to enhance the independence of judicial power, all possible me-
ans of exerting pressure on judges by, or on behalf of the executive branch 
through bribery, blackmail, threats and/or interference in the due process 
of law (for instance by claiming that someone is guilty by publishing slan-
derous articles before the ruling of the court) should be outlawed. To this 
end, appropriate working and personal security conditions should be provi-
ded for judges, including the formation of security forces under the autho-
rity of State Court Administration.
An important guarantee of court’s independence is the principle of the 
‘immovability’ of judges. The proposal to appoint judges for ten-year terms 
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with the possibility of reappointment goes against the ‘immovability’ prin-
ciple, and should be reconsidered. 
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine plays an important role by interpre-
ting the Constitution of Ukraine, safeguarding the principle of the rule of 
law and providing a balance between the branches of power.  In order to 
enhance its role in the protection and enforcement of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, it is necessary to introduce a process of constitutional 
appeal, which is used in many democratic countries.
The Constitution provides a balanced mechanism for the formation of 
the Constitutional Court by the three branches of power. This approach is 
necessary to ensure its political neutrality and, what is more important, its 
impartiality. Under these circumstances, the proposal to deprive the Con-
gress of Judges of Ukraine of its right to appoint one-third of Constitutio-
nal Court members, and to share this right between the parliament and the 
president, seems to be unreasonable and could lead to a confrontation be-
tween the legislative and executive branches, thus potentially creating im-
balance in the mechanism of division of power.
In order to harmonise the legislation on prosecution with the Consti-
tution and with European standards, it is necessary to take the following 
steps. First of all, it is necessary to cancel the function of supervisor enfor-
cing and implementing laws and to make appropriate amendments to the 
Law on Prosecution. Secondly, the proposals to grant the office of the pro-
secutor the right to supervise the enforcement of rights and freedoms of 
citizens, thus giving the prosecutor a general supervisory function, absent 
in democratic systems based on the principle of rule of law, should be wi-
thdrawn. The court should be the only institution to have the final juris-
diction over the enforcement of rights and freedoms of citizens. Thirdly, it 
is necessary to deprive the prosecutor of the right to handle pre-trial in-
quiry, as the latter is not stipulated within the Constitution. To this end, a 
system for pre-trial inquiry bodies and relevant legislation should be es-
tablished.
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The implementation of law and the quality of the judiciary
The low level of implementation of court decisions obviously dimini-
shes their effectiveness. In practice, only one-third of all decisions are car-
ried out.  This is due to the high pressure of work, low professionalism, ina-
dequate technical and material maintenance of the  ‘Implementation Servi-
ce’ and the absence of procedure for certain categories of court decisions 
and judgements.  
To improve this situation, there should be an increase in the number of 
staff as well as financial assistance for the ‘Implementation Service’. It is also 
important to make appropriate amendments to Ukrainian legislation in re-
cords management and on the ‘Implementation Service’ concerning proce-
dures for certain categories of court decisions.
Proper material, technical and financial support is the key precondition 
to the satisfactory functioning of judicial power. Unfortunately, this basic re-
quirement is not fulfilled in the Ukraine. Courts, in their majority, are situ-
ated in ill-equipped dilapidated buildings; elementary working conditions 
and financing are absent. 
The quality of the administration of justice strictly depends on the selec-
tion and training of professional judges. Their work experience in the legal 
sphere should be increased considerably from  the present three-year requ-
irement. There is also a need to generally improve the education of judges 
and lawyers. To this end it is necessary to:
•  increase accreditation requirements for law faculties and law 
schools;
•  provide in the legislation the obligation to prepare lawyers only in spe-
cialised high schools or university faculties;
•  develop appropriate post-graduate programmes.
Finally, the further development of legal and judicial reform requires that 
more attention be paid to international and European law and legal practi-
ces. For instance the working methods employed by judges of the European 
Court of Human Rights should be studied and implemented; the Convention 
on Human Rights, and other international treaties signed and ratified by Ukra-
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ine should be implemented and enforced. Therefore, organisations of lawy-
ers-consultants who are specialists in European and human rights law should 
be founded. In this matter, the Supreme Court of Ukraine should enhance its 
activities in clarifying and defining its practices in these areas. 
3.2.6. Development of Civil Society
Civil society in Ukraine has developed rapidly in the last decade. About 
35 000 NGOs existed in Ukraine in 2003, up from only 4000 in 1995. Howe-
ver, the third sector has still not achieved the level needed to play a decisi-
ve role in public life. There are still many obstacles impeding its growth and 
functioning in Ukraine.
The government habitually over-regulates NGO activity. Philanthropy 
and volunteerism are insufficiently developed and are usually connected 
with elections. This can be explained by the increasing possibilities for ac-
tive persons to find self-fulfilment in NGOs, since here they can begin to in-
fluence local life and decision-making. Local authorities have also started 
to express interest in NGO activities aimed at helping the poor, children or 
the disabled. At the same time, authorities sometimes use NGOs to legitimi-
se their own decisions. Some of these organisations supported by the exe-
cutive or associated with government-connected interest groups represent 
GONGOs (‘governmental’ NGOs) or QUANGOs (quasi-NGOs). 
The legal basis for NGO activity is outdated, as it is based on the 1992 
Law on Associations of Citizens, the 1997 Law on Charity and Charitable Or-
ganisations and various governmental regulations. A draft Law on Non-pro-
fit Organisations passed its first reading in October 2000, but since then it 
has not been taken up by the parliament. Registration of NGOs remains qu-
ite complicated. Thus, the adoption of the new law is an urgent priority. 
Another fundamental issue for civil society is the absence of a law regula-
ting lobbying, which in practice prevents the legal participation of interest 
groups in politics. 
There is no clear financial management regulation of NGO activities. 
Double book-keeping is common as a means of avoiding excessive Ukra-
3. Three agendas
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inian taxation. Although NGOs may earn income for activities specified in 
their statutes, tax bodies frequently refuse to recognise certain activities as 
non-commercial, even if money was spent on non-profit activities or on the 
general maintenance of the organisation. New legal acts should be adop-
ted and implemented to stimulate the charitable activity and to lessen the 
tax burden on NGOs. 
The government should develop special programmes to support NGOs 
(i.e. involving them into public research on the vital issue of self-govern-
ment). At the same time, it is important to have transparent competition 
for governmental funds and to involve independent experts with recogni-
sed authority in their field in review commissions.     
Most NGO resources are concentrated in the capital and in some regio-
nal centres. These resources may be used for supporting NGO activity on 
the regional level, especially in eastern and southern Ukraine. Coalition bu-
ilding among NGOs may become one of the priorities for third sector deve-
lopment. Of special importance is the trilateral co-operation at the local le-
vel between authorities, businesses and NGOs, although the independen-
ce of NGOs should of course not be compromised. Local and regional coun-
cils may stimulate civic activity by adopting norms on public meetings, pu-
blic hearings, local NGO initiatives and so forth.
The campaign against corruption is of special importance. Ukrainian NGOs 
spread anti-corruption awareness materials and hold public discussions. Yet, 
the relatively low budgets of these projects (supported mainly by western 
donors) and absence of interest from the authorities prevents them from 
reaching the wider public. There are, however, some positive examples. Al-
though admission exams to universities are considered highly corrupt, the 
effectiveness of computerised evaluations of applicant tests at the Universi-
ty of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has been widely acknowledged.
Ukrainian NGOs can play an important role in safeguarding democratic 
standards. They were very active during the 2002 election. The All-Ukrainian 
Monitoring Committee, established in December 2001, informed the public 
on the fairness of the campaign. On the eve of the 2004 presidential elec-
51
The Enlarged EU and Ukraine
– New Relations. Final Report
3. Three agendas
tion, the role of NGOs in monitoring this process should be especially sup-
ported. It is also advisable to create a council of human rights groups, which 
will serve as a consultative and co-ordinating body and will co-operate with 
the parliamentary ombudsman and authorities. After the 2002 parliamen-
tary election, several parliamentary committees and ministries created ad-
visory boards that include NGO representatives. These steps increase trans-
parency, the role of NGOs in public debate and in drafting laws. One of the 
main problems of the Ukrainian third sector is the lack of domestic sources 
of funding. Therefore, western support to Ukraine’s civil society and inde-
pendent mass media remains crucial. 
3.2.7. Freedom of media
Independent media play a key role in the process of democratic transfor-
mation in post-communist states. Thus it has attracted considerable atten-
tion from the EU and other international bodies. The freedom of the media 
is one of the most sensitive political issues for Ukraine.
The importance of this sphere has increased in recent years, when nu-
merous cases of violence against journalists (including murders) in Ukraine 
were disclosed. There is freedom of speech in Ukraine, but not freedom of 
media. In its annual 2002 report on media freedom in the world, Freedom 
House put Ukraine in the group of ‘non-free’ countries (earlier it was  ‘par-
tially free’). New crimes against journalists and the arrival of non-official go-
vernment instructions for media (temniki) were the major reason for this.
In Ukraine, the private media sector represents the major part of na-
tional and regional media. However, owners usually depend on their links 
with the authorities, therefore media controlled by them are unlikely to be 
prepared to express views not corresponding to those of the authorities. 
At the same time, a small number of genuinely independent media conti-
nue to work both on the national and regional levels. A number of opposi-
tion newspapers, such as ‘Svoboda’ (Freedom), ‘Vecherniye Vesti’ (Evening 
News) are available – especially in big cities. Even though, in many cases, 
these newspapers serve particular political aims, they remain the only so-
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urce of critical information on the authorities. In 2003, the new private TV 
studio NBM was established (it is now the fifth channel). Its owners are re-
presentatives of the opposition block ‘Our Ukraine’. This channel covers 
Kyiv and some big cities. Its news, ‘Express-Inform’, is approaching Europe-
an standards. Despite decreasing pressure on the media since 2002, the au-
thorities still place impediments to some independent broadcasting agen-
cies and newspapers. 
As a result, there is an acute lack of live commentary on political deve-
lopments on Ukrainian television. Live discussions between ruling politi-
cians and their opposition counterparts are no longer aired. On the most 
popular TV channels (especially those controlled by the current head of 
the presidential administration, Viktor Medvedchuk), systematic bias in fa-
vour of the authorities are observable. 
Recently, some essential steps were made in developing Ukrainian legi-
slation in accordance with European standards thanks to the efforts of the 
Parliamentary Committee for the Freedom of media. In particular, a clear de-
finition of ‘censorship’ was provided by law in 2003, with censorship itself 
being strictly prohibited. Despite this, problems in implementing existing 
legislation on them media remain.
In order to ensure freedom of the media, the following measures are 
necessary: 
•  investigations of the murders of journalists and violations of media ri-
ghts must be completed;
•  state TV and radio must be transformed into truly public TV and ra-
dio companies;
• legislation providing for transparent rules for the media market must 
be enacted;
•  new laws (usually submitted by security structures to parliament) which 
aim to limit journalists’ rights or to establish punishments for investi-
gative reporting must be blocked and not adopted;
•  transparency of the ownership of media must be guaranteed, the real 
names of media owners must be exposed;
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• the authorities must stop submitting instructions to the media (so-cal-
led temniki, the existence of which was confirmed by journalists seve-
ral times during 2002–2003)
• existing limits on foreign ownership of Ukrainian media should be li-
fted.
3.2.8. The rule of law
Despite the fact that the principle of rule of law is stipulated in Article 
8 of the Constitution and in a number of other legislative acts, its substan-
ce has not been finally defined either in the doctrine or in practice. One of 
the most pressing problems in Ukraine is the recognition of the suprema-
cy of human rights and freedoms over the state and the direct effect of the 
Constitution and its provisions, which determine the rights and freedoms 
of individuals. The Ukrainian courts should directly implement the princi-
ple of rule of law.
The legal system and law enforcement should correspond to the princi-
ples of legal certainty and proportionality, which form the basis of legal or-
der in the EU and its member states. In order to provide the effective imple-
mentation of rights and duties by the citizens, there is a clear need to upgra-
de the society’s level of legal awareness. Educational institutions, NGOs, 
and the mass media should play significant roles. Individuals should be in-
formed about their rights and possess means to protect them. In particular, 
access to court and legal assistance should be guaranteed, including legal 
assistance to the poor.
Implementation of the rule of law also depends on law enforcement 
agencies. In this regard, there is a need for reforming internal affairs bodies 
in order to fulfil Council of Europe recommendations concerning the trans-
fer of the passport service and some other functions from the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs to other institutions. 
Corruption is the result of, among other factors, the inadequate func-
tioning of state and social institutions, legal and economic systems and re-
presents a societal reaction to the inadequate functioning of the state. In 
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order to cope with those negative phenomena it is necessary to adopt the 
following measures:
• introduce proper remuneration for civil servants;
•  conduct information campaigns in order to illegitimatise instances of 
corruption;
•  adopt appropriate recruitment procedures to ensure high professional 
and moral standards among civil servants;
•  introduce transparency into the decision making process of state bo-
dies, especially concerning  economic matters;
• reduce the tax burden and simplify tax procedures;
•  promote and enforce transparency and competitiveness in the system 
of public procurement and in the privatisation process;
•  improve the system of economic and financial control and counteract 
legalisation of illegally obtained profits.
3.2.9. Approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law 
The process of adapting Ukrainian legislation to EU rules and regula-
tions, the acquis communautaire is a key element of Ukraine’s European in-
tegration. This should cover the legal system in general and include cur-
rent legislation, the drafting of new legislation, law enforcement and pro-
cedural rules. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the ada-
ptation process, there is a substantial need to involve all branches of po-
wer: parliament and executive bodies at the law drafting stage, judicial in-
stitutions at the law enforcement stage. Adaptation is not an isolated pro-
cess, and must be accompanied by legal, judicial, administrative and eco-
nomic and other reforms.
Close co-operation between Ukraine and candidate countries is of utmost 
importance at every stage. The candidate countries’ White Book could be a 
general guide for Ukraine through the process of adaptation.    
Some initiatives should be introduced with the intent of improving in-
stitutional co-operation and capacity for the process of transition. Accor-
ding to current legislation, the draft examining its compliance with EU le-
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gislation covers only drafts elaborated by the government. Therefore, it is 
necessary to make the examination of drafts initiated by any party obli-
gatory. The implementation of this process could be entrusted to the go-
vernmental body responsible for co-ordinating the adaptation process. 
The same procedure should be required for amendments, proposed by 
MPs, to draft legislation that is to be harmonised with EU acquis commu-
nautaire. This function can be placed within the competencies of the Com-
mittee for European Integration, or the relevant department in the parlia-
mentary Chancellery.
In order to significantly improve institutional capabilities in various 
aspects of adaptation, the philosophy of staff training, information flow 
and financial assistance needs to be changed.  Taking into account Ukraine-
’s great shortage of staff specialised in EU legislation, the following steps 
are possible:
•  a national concept for the professional training of civil servants in the 
areas of European law and European integration could be elabora-
ted;
•  the introduction and/or improvement of studies on European law and 
integration in institutions of higher education in Ukraine, including in-
viting professors from leading European universities;
•  establishing European language studies for civil servants engaged in 
adaptation;
•  introducing an obligatory programme on European law in the training 
of judges and lawyers;
•  discussing with the EU possibilities of expanding educational and twin-
ning programs for Ukraine, involving EU institutions such as the Com-
mission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.
In the field of information support of adaptation process, the following 
measures should be taken:
•  a website in Ukrainian containing information about European integra-
tion, development of relations between the EU and Ukraine, official EU 
documentation and the state of implementation of the National Pro-
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gram on Adaptation of Legislation should be established. It will pro-
vide state bodies, educational centres and the wider Ukrainian public 
with access to EU legislation and other relevant information.
•  state bodies involved in the adaptation process should be provided 
with direct and easy access to EU documentation, including access to 
the EU database – CELEX – and official EU legal paper issues. 
•  key EU legal documents should be published and disbursed in Ukra-
inian. 
•  unified rules for EU legal translation should be elaborated and enfor-
ced and a centralised translation system should be established. A de-
tailed EU glossary in Ukrainian should be compiled with participation 
of relevant Ukrainian and European linguistic institutions.
3.3. EU-Ukraine policy in the agenda of New Members 
         (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic)
3.3.1. The main arguments
There is a number of factors justifying the active engagement of the new 
EU member states generally, and the Visegrad countries in particular, in the 
formulation of EU policy towards Ukraine. 
First of all, once the Visegrad countries join the EU, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia’s eastern borders with Ukraine will become part of the European 
Union’s eastern border. The process of building this border and the related 
opportunities and risks will fall on the three Visegrad countries. Therefore, 
they must play a key role in re-shaping the character of the new EU border; 
in fact, they will be responsible for determining whether it becomes a new 
iron curtain or a line of co-operation. 
The most important transport corridors – road transport routes, rail-
way lines and oil and gas pipelines – that connect the Ukraine with we-
stern Europe run through Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Re-
public. Ukraine shares a transit oil and gas pipelines system with the Vi-
segrad countries, which is of strategic importance for EU energy security 
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as it connects Russian, Central Asian and Caspian basin energy producers 
with EU consumers.
Ukraine has established unique ties with the countries of East-Central Eu-
rope, which stem from cultural, linguistic and historical closeness, as well as 
geographic proximity. The Hungarian, Polish and Slovak minorities in Ukra-
ine, and vice versa – the Ukrainian minority in Poland and Slovakia, are im-
portant factors that reinforce this closeness. These ties allow for a better un-
derstanding of the realities in these countries and for more effective co-ope-
ration, particularly on the local community and NGO levels.
The Visegrad countries share with Ukraine a common totalitarian past in 
the eastern bloc. From this perspective, they are best qualified out of all the 
members of the enlarged EU to share with Ukraine know-how on post-com-
munist political transformation and market reform. First, they are direct ne-
ighbours of Ukraine; second, they are close to Ukraine culturally and lingu-
istically, and finally, they successfully passed through the difficult transition 
and modernisation process over the last decade, which is still an on-going 
challenge for Ukraine.
EU-Ukraine relations could present an important part of a new agenda of 
regional co-operation within the Visegrad Group. The political objectives of 
Visegrad co-operation focused since its establishment on the promotion of 
the Visegrad countries’ readiness for and contribution to European and Euro-
Atlantic integration. Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic worked 
together and assisted each other in preparations for EU and NATO member-
ship. As the priority of regional co-operation is achieved, the Visegrad Four are 
now looking for new objectives aimed at ensuring the Visegrad area as one 
characterised by political stability and economic prosperity, which is open to 
co-operation with other countries in the region, including East-Central Euro-
pean countries. Relations with Ukraine within the EU-Ukraine context could 
become one of the pillars of a new Visegrad agenda for years to come.
The following are the main problems in EU-Ukraine relations that requ-
ire a change in the EU approach toward Ukraine from a Visegrad perspecti-
ve. The Visegrad countries are firmly interested in: 
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•  more flexibility in implementation of the Schengen regime. The imple-
mentation of Schengen legislation along the eastern borders of new 
member states, required within the EU accession process, helps to so-
lve major problems of the EU related to the security of the common 
integrated area of free movement of persons, goods, investments and 
services. On the other hand, it has a negative impact on bilateral rela-
tions between new member states and their eastern neighbours. The 
Schengen regime must ensure the EU border closed and safe against 
illegal activities from third countries, but at the same time it should be-
come as open as possible for economic co-operation and human con-
tacts between countries on both sides of the EU external border.
•  more active involvement by Ukraine in EU eastern policy.  Ukraine must 
be engaged in the ongoing EU-Russia talks on the creation of a Common 
European Economic Space, which is in fact a road map for gradual libe-
ralisation of foreign trade between the EU and Russia. The same relates 
to EU-Russia dialogues in some other fields, for instance energy.  
•  more focus on supporting democratisation and civil society in Ukraine. 
So far, EU policy towards Ukraine has focused on contacts with authori-
ties on the central level. However, the assumption that proper relations 
among leaders will guarantee the genuine advancement of Ukraine to 
the EU has proven to be illusory. Important agreements concluded by 
leaders have failed to lead to changes in the attitudes and mentality of 
the people in Ukraine, and such changes are indispensable for achie-
ving a lasting understanding. Helping Ukraine in its post-communist 
transition, the EU should refocus its aid policy in favour of supporting 
civil society and local self-governance at the expense of state develop-
ment programs, or at least make its support more balanced.
3.3.2. Export of know-how
The first and most tangible contribution of the Visegrad countries for 
the preparation of Ukraine to participate in the process of European inte-
gration is the transfer of juridical and practical know-how on the associa-
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tion and accession processes that have been just experienced by those co-
untries. All the Visegrad states have at their disposal developed structu-
res of civil servants training for the purpose of those processes. It would 
be logical and natural to use those structures to train Ukrainian civil se-
rvants in the same subject, starting with the well-known principle – first 
train the trainers. 
Administrative bodies responsible for the process of European integra-
tion that were in charge of co-ordinating that process in the Visegrad co-
untries on a national level (like the Polish Office of the Committee for Eu-
ropean Integration) should organise special units charged with the transfer 
of know-how to the Ukrainian counterparts. The establishment of special 
international workshops at the central administration level for the civil se-
rvants of central administrative bodies should be considered. Units responsi-
ble for the European co-ordination of the activity of a given ministry exist in 
each ministry of the Visegrad countries. The employees of those units sho-
uld meet in regular working conferences with their Ukrainian colleagues to 
share their experiences. 
In the case of the new EU members in East-Central Europe, the develop-
ment of local and regional government was an essential component in the 
transition towards the building of modern European state and society. As 
seen in the previous chapter (Ukraine’s agenda for the EU), Ukraine has ta-
ken only limited steps in this direction. The Visegrad countries could provi-
de know-how in this process. As far as regional centres of European infor-
mation and the training of local government administration are concerned, 
the lack of funding can be the main obstacle to develop that kind of activi-
ty. Thus, EU financial support would be very desirable. 
The experience of Visegrad countries in developing civil society could also 
be transferred to Ukraine. Visegrad NGOs already have considerable contacts 
with their counterparts in Ukraine, which should be expanded.
Extension of higher education to new parts of the society is an impor-
tant factor in building civil society. Academics and students have always been 
active as citizens. The number of students in Visegrad countries has grown 
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enormously since 1989. The knowledge of young people is the most impor-
tant factor for the long-range success of the reforms. The Visegrad countries 
should create a special programme for students allowing Ukrainians to stu-
dy in the Visegrad countries. Significantly, these programmes should ensu-
re that students are allowed to transfer their credit points won in the Vise-
grad countries to their home (Ukrainian) university and to continue studies 
without losing that semester. This programme should also allow students 
from Visegrad countries to study in Ukraine.
3.3.3. Infrastructure
Transport networks between the Visegrad countries and Ukraine consti-
tute a hub in the transport network connecting the EU with Russia, Central 
Asia and the Caspian basin. In order to facilitate human contacts and eco-
nomic co-operation between the EU and Ukraine, the current communica-
tion and transport infrastructure between the Visegrad countries and Ukra-
ine must be essentially extended and modernised.
Ukraine shares with the Visegrad countries transit oil and gas pipelines 
system, which is of strategic importance for the EU energy security as it con-
nects Russian, Central Asian and Caspian basin energy producers with EU 
consumers. Thus, security and safety of energy network infrastructure on the 
territory of Ukraine and Visegrad countries is of strategic importance for the 
EU. With the establishment of an EU-wide internal energy market and rela-
ted policies, security of energy supply is principally an issue for the EU as a 
whole. However, the Visegrad countries could play an important role in in-
creasing EU security of energy supply through diversification of energy so-
urces and transportation routes. The Visegrad countries have an interest in 
the development of pipelines through their territories for supplies from the 
Caspian oil and natural gas fields. The Odessa – Brody oil pipeline contribu-
tes to this, regardless of whether it is extended to Płock and Gdańsk or con-
nected with the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline. It should thus be-
come one of the priorities for EU assistance in the field of energy networks 
provided to external partners.
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Transport networks (road and rail) connecting Ukraine with the EU 
cross through the territory of the Visegrad countries. However, the exi-
sting transport infrastructure, especially in the border regions of eastern 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and western Ukraine is outdated and suffers 
from under-investment. Additionally, only two of the ten new multi-modal 
corridors, which were added to the existing transport corridors within the 
EU to meet the EU enlargement needs, connect the Visegrad countries di-
rectly with Ukraine. (These are Corridor III: Berlin – Cracow – Lviv – Kyiv, 
and Corridor V: Venice – Ljubljana – Budapest – Uzhgorod – Lviv – Kyiv.) 
The underdeveloped transport infrastructure in eastern parts of Hunga-
ry, Poland and Slovakia will become a barrier for EU–Ukraine economic 
relations and human contacts. The EU must consider its modernisation 
in developing future Trans-European Networks (TEN) projects. Only three 
of the ten corridors connect western Europe with eastern Europe, while 
the remaining seven corridors are aimed at improving connections on a 
north-south axis. It is in the interest of the Visegrad countries that the EU 
places greater emphasis on east-west connections, in particular those lin-
king Ukraine to the EU.
3.3.4. Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
In order to make the eastern border of the enlarged EU safe against il-
legal activities, the EU and Visegrad countries must improve the security of 
the eastern peripheries of the EU through modernisation of border infra-
structure and increased quality and numbers of border services and poli-
ce. It is necessary to organise common training programs on border protec-
tion standards and rules in the EU involving representatives of border servi-
ces from the Visegrad countries and Ukraine. Such programs must also inc-
lude representatives of the police and judicial organs aiming at facilitating 
co-operation and co-ordinated actions in the field of JHA. The Visegrad co-
untries should support the idea of having permanent liaison officers from 
Ukraine at the respective border control units on their border with Ukraine 
and vice versa. 
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The Visegrad countries should consider the option of establishing com-
mon Visegrad border control units on their borders with Ukraine. Czech, 
Polish and Hungarian servicemen would be invited to serve in the border 
control units of Slovakia on the Slovak-Ukrainian section of the border; Slo-
vaks, Czechs and Hungarians could serve in Poland, and Czechs, Slovaks 
and Poles in Hungary. This Visegrad experience could consequently be uti-
lised by the EU in advancing its plans on the common EU border service in 
the years to come.
In the long-term perspective, these Visegrad, and subsequently EU com-
mon units could later be merged with Ukrainian border guards through the 
establishment of a common border guard service on the Polish-Ukrainian, 
Slovak-Ukrainian and Hungarian-Ukrainian borders. The Visegrad countries 
must help Ukraine as far as its qualifying for full participation in the system 
of early prevention of illegal migration is concerned. 
In parallel with the above initiatives, the EU and the Visegrad countries 
particularly must aim at making the future EU-Ukraine border as open as po-
ssible, physically, culturally and psychologically for Ukrainian citizens who 
want to cross it legally. Actions taken in this direction must include the mo-
dernisation of the consular infrastructure and information campaigns on visa 
obtaining procedures. A particularly important objective is to provide spe-
cial training of the representatives of border services in Visegrad countries 
themselves in terms of their honest and respectful attitude toward persons 
who cross the border. Officers of these services are those who will represent 
the EU to travellers; their contact with these services may impinge on their 
perception of the entire EU.
The long-term priority for the Visegrad countries must be assisting 
Ukraine in moving from the EU list of ‘visa countries’ to the ‘visa free’ list. 
Although this process will depend much on internal developments and 
reforms in Ukraine itself, there are some possibilities for taking actions 
and policies in the JHA field that should be seriously considered and ini-
tiated by the Visegrad countries aiming at making the visa regime as fle-
xible as possible in the short-term and middle-term. Furthermore, the Vi-
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segrad countries must aim at making their visas accessible to Ukrainian ci-
tizens by reducing or removing the visa fee and improving consular servi-
ces. So long as Ukrainian citizens are required to have visas to enter the 
EU, Visegrad countries could initiate co-ordination of consular services of 
EU member states on the territory of Ukraine to make their visas accessi-
ble in as many regional centres as possible. Another solution, which will 
improve accessibility of visas for Ukrainian citizens with permanent resi-
dence in regions far from Kyiv or western parts of Ukraine, is to move the 
process of obtaining visas to border crossing points; making sure, howe-
ver, of adequacy of latency time for visa applicants once they come from 
more distant regions of Ukraine.
The Visegrad countries will be authorised to issue their national long-
term visas for third country citizens (multiple entry visas valid for one year 
with six-month residency) even after their entry into the Schengen regime. 
This should be applied to maintain cross-border co-operation and move-
ment of residents of bordering regions with natural long-term economic 
and human ties. 
Since March 2001, Slovakia has liberalised its visa regime with Ukraine 
(imposed in June 2000), apart from other implemented measures. For exam-
ple, the permanent residents of 83 villages on both sides of the border were 
granted special exemptions from the regular visa regime. Residents of those 
villages are granted multiple-entry visas (valid for one year with six-month 
residence) free of charge. This option should be seriously considered by the 
other Visegrad countries in terms of its eventual application on Ukrainian 
citizens living in border regions along the future EU eastern border. Howe-
ver, it would be a viable option only provided that Ukrainian authorities pro-
ve their ability to ensure that the issuing of residence certificates for Ukra-
inian citizens in the regions in question is transparent and free from abuse. 
Concomitantly, commonly the Visegrad countries must lobby within the EU 
that such solutions do not represent any threat to the internal security of 
the Schengen area. The European Commission recently proposed measures 
to facilitate such cross-border traffic.
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The Visegrad countries must also consider an option to develop a com-
mon visa policy within the Schengen regime following a Polish model (visa 
for Ukrainian citizens free of charge) or Slovak special solutions for residents 
of border areas as mentioned above.
The Visegrad countries must take an active part in the EU JHA debate in 
the years to come. This should aim at correcting certain ‘Schengen stereo-
types’ still prevailing in EU countries, which follow public moods and per-
ceptions rather than realities on the ground. Thus, the key purpose of visa 
procedures – as it is understood in the EU and consequently handled in the 
Schengen acquis – is to eliminate the risk of illegal immigration. However, 
the Slovak – Ukrainian experiences learned over the three ‘visa years’, bac-
ked-up by facts, makes the following counter-argument: the link between 
visa regime and the protection of borders against illegal migration from 
third countries is completely unfounded. These are two different effects that 
should be treated differently and should be addressed by different policies 
and actions. The visa regime has had a significant impact on the legal mo-
vement of persons through the Slovak-Ukrainian border since it was introdu-
ced in June 2000, and especially the reciprocal travel of citizens of both co-
untries. However, it has had practically no impact on the flow of illegal mi-
gration from third countries on the Slovak-Ukrainian border. It is in the com-
mon interest of the Visegrad countries that experiences like this are proper-
ly communicated to the EU public, as this will lay the foundations for even-
tual changes of EU visa policy, making it more flexible and in accordance 
with realities on the ground.   
The Visegrad countries will be largely responsible for managing the 
external land border of the enlarged EU. However, this is a task perfor-
med for the benefit of the entire EU and the burden, financial and other-
wise, should therefore be distributed evenly across the EU. The EU as such 
should therefore provide additional assistance to the Visegrad countries 
to perform this task, and support them in implementing the measures pre-
sented above.
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3.3.5. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
The establishment of multinational military units for international opera-
tions are essential components in the development of European military ca-
pabilities, both in the context of NATO and in the EU European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The Visegrad countries, and to some extent Ukraine, 
are part of these developments. Closer co-operation between the Visegrad 
countries and Ukraine in creating multinational military units could beco-
me an important element in European efforts in this field. 
Co-operation between two Visegrad countries (Hungary and Poland) and 
Ukraine in peacekeeping already takes place. A Polish-Ukrainian peaceke-
eping battalion (UKRPOLBAT, with approximately 750 troops) has been ac-
tive in Bosnia and Kosovo. There is also the Ukrainian-Hungarian Tisza bat-
talion.  Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic agreed in 2001 to create 
a Polish-Slovak-Czech brigade consisting of three battalions by 2005, with 
2500 troops. 
France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have created regional Mediterranean Eu-
ropean intervention forces known as Eurofor (land operations) and Euroma-
for (maritime operations). Thus, the pattern to follow is ready for the Visegrad 
countries and Ukraine. These countries could create Centreurofor as a regio-
nal component available to the ESDP. 
It is worth including the Baltic States to Ukrainian-Visegrad military 
co-operation as well. There, a Polish-Lithuanian battalion (LITPOLBAT) al-
ready exists and a Lithuanian platoon (30 soldiers) has already taken part 
in the Polish-Ukrainian KFOR contribution in Kosovo, in 2000. Polish, Ukra-
inian, Hungarian, Slovak, Latvian and Lithuanian contingents in a multinal-
tional brigade in Iraq is a first example of such practical co-operation in a 
post-conflict stabilisation mission. The troops are trained in a real service 
and that experience, due to the double subordination (NATO/EU) system 
of the EU intervention forces, may be useful for future EU-led operations. 
Such an extended Centreurofor could constitute a considerable contribu-
tion to the ESDP.
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As a minimum, Centreurofor would consist of 2000 Polish troops, 1800 
Ukrainian forces, a Polish-Czech-Slovak brigade of 2500 troops, LITPOLBAT, 
which consists of 780 troops, a Hungarian battalion of approximately 600 sol-
diers and a Latvian company consisting of 100 troops. As a maximum, Cen-
treurofor could consist of a full Polish brigade of 4000 troops (promised as 
the Polish contribution to the ESDP), a Ukrainian contingent of 1800 troops, 
UKRPOLBAT with its 750 soldiers, a Polish-Czech-Slovak brigade of 2500 tro-
ops, LITPOLBAT (780), a Latvian company (100), and a Hungarian battalion 
with 600 troops. Centreurofor would thus consist of at least 7800 troops, 
and may include as many as 10 530 troops, including a sizeable Ukrainian 
contingent. This would constitute a considerable contribution to the EU in-
tervention force, initially planned to consist of 60 000 troops.
3.3.6. Visegrad assistance for Ukraine
In addition to assistance provided by the EU, the Visegrad countries sho-
uld consider using their own resources to maintain and expand co-operation 
and reciprocal people-to-people contacts between themselves and Ukraine. 
This could take place bilaterally or through joint efforts, for instance thro-
ugh the International Visegrad Fund (IVF). 
Since its establishment in May 2000, the IVF supports numerous pro-
jects promoting regional co-operation among the Visegrad countries in 
fields such as culture, science, education, exchange of young people and 
cross-border co-operation. Although a small project – known as Visegrad 
Plus – has been established to include non-Visegrad countries, the bulk of 
the funding provided is limited to the Visegrad countries. The IVF program-
mes, and the Visegrad Plus project in particular, should be expanded to fa-
cilitate co-operation and people-to-people contacts between Visegrad co-
untries and Ukraine. These should focus especially on co-operation betwe-
en NGOs and among local and regional governments, which would comple-
ment EU assistance programmes.
Although development assistance is funded directly by national govern-
ments and provided bilaterally, there is considerable scope for co-ordination 
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of the policies of the Visegrad countries in the aid provided bilaterally to Ukra-
ine. Co-ordination of development assistance to Ukraine within the Visegrad 
Group could prevent duplication of efforts. Furthermore, such co-ordination 
could create synergies, multiplying the effects of still rather modest individu-
al assistance capacities of the Visegrad Group. 
3. Three agendas
68
More than Neighbours
4. Main areas of integration
1 The numbers are based on figures from the Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics and 
the European Commission.
4.1. Economy
4.1.1.  Trade
The EU is an important trading partner for Ukraine. Almost 25% of Ukra-
ine’s exports go to the EU, while imports from the EU account for approxi-
mately 20% of total Ukrainian imports1. Ukraine is of marginal importance 
to the EU as a trading partner, however, accounting for approximately 0.3% 
of total EU external trade. Ukraine’s exports to the EU consist mainly of agri-
cultural products and semi-finished products, especially from the metallurgi-
cal industry, originating from enterprises which have not been restructured 
and represent relics of the Soviet command economy. EU exports to Ukra-
ine, on the other hand, consist of finished products, mainly machinery, che-
mical products, transport and textiles. 
EU enlargement will considerably increase the importance of the EU 
in Ukraine’s external trade. While the CIS will remain the main source of 
imports to Ukraine, mainly due to imports of energy, the enlarged EU will 
become Ukraine’s principal market for exports, account for approximately 
40% of total Ukrainian exports. As trade with Ukraine is more significant 
for the new members, the importance of Ukraine as a trading partner of 
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the EU will increase though still constitute a small share of total EU exter-
nal trade. The accession of East-Central European countries to the EU is li-
kely to increase trade between Ukraine and the EU, as tariff barriers will 
be reduced to the EU-level. This will be partially offset by a decrease in 
Ukrainian exports to the EU due to the introduction of EU product stan-
dards in the new member states which many Ukrainian exporters will be 
unable to comply with.
The main trade issues in EU-Ukraine relations concern the recognition of 
the market status of the Ukrainian economy by the EU, Ukraine’s accession to 
the WTO and, in a longer-term perspective, the creation of a free trade area, 
as envisaged under the PCA.
In the short-term, priority should be accorded to the recognition of Ukra-
ine’s status as a market economy and Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. Pro-
gress has been made on WTO accession recently, although important issu-
es remain unresolved. In terms of EU-Ukraine relations, WTO is a precondi-
tion for further trade liberalisation and is in the interest of both the EU and 
Ukraine that the WTO negotiations are concluded quickly. 
The granting of ‘market economy status’ has become a major issue on 
the EU-Ukraine agenda. The EU currently grants market economy status to 
Ukrainian companies on a case by case basis. This allows these companies 
to use their own statistics in case the EU initiates anti-dumping procedures. 
Conferring such a status on the Ukrainian economy as a whole would have 
a limited impact on the EU economy, but would be politically important in 
Ukraine. The EU’s unwillingness to confer such a status on Ukraine weakens 
the position of pro-European reformers in Ukraine and fuels perceptions of 
exclusion. The EU’s 2002 decision to confer such a status on Russia already 
raised such perceptions. 
Although average EU tariffs on imports from Ukraine are very low, si-
gnificant restrictions remain in areas where Ukraine has a comparative ad-
vantage, such as in steel, textiles and agriculture. Progress in liberalisation 
in these areas have recently been made, for instance the removal of quotas 
on Ukrainian export of textiles to the EU. This process should be speeded 
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up and broadened to include agriculture. As in the case of market economy 
status, the overall impact on the EU would be limited, while the impact in 
Ukraine could be considerable. 
This liberalisation process should remain asymmetrical as the Ukrainian 
economy in general, and sectors such as automobiles, agriculture, mecha-
nical engineering, and radio-electronic industry in particular, would be una-
ble to withstand the competitive pressures of the EU market. In a medium 
to long-term perspective, this asymmetric trade regime should be gradual-
ly removed as part of the creation of a free trade zone.
The agreement on co-ordination of steps within the framework of the 
Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is likely to 
slow the process of creating a free trade area with the EU. Therefore, it wo-
uld be more advisable to transform the rules of economic relations in the 
format of ‘the four’, on basis of the WTO. Such an approach would permit 
to check fears concerning ‘integration in two directions’. 
One of the ways to develop trade structure is by increasing the share 
of services. This has considerable growth-potential as Ukraine is a poten-
tial exporter for tourism, transport, the construction sector and the infor-
mational sphere. In addition, these kinds of economic activities run much 
smaller chances to be subjected to anti-dumping investigations and other 
restrictive procedures.
Development of trade relations is an important precondition of political 
rapprochement. These processes are: approximation of legislative base, es-
tablishing and strengthening permanent contacts between representatives 
of business elites, mutual understanding of common interests, as well as a 
common vision of the ways of mutual development. 
4.1.2. Investment
To date, Ukraine has failed to attract a significant amount of foreign in-
vestments. This can be attributed to its comparatively unfriendly investment 
environment, high political risks, and a prolonged transformation reces-
sion. All foreign investors in Ukraine face more or less the same problems, 
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and it is difficult to identify the specific problems of investors either from 
the EU or candidate countries. In terms of the origin of foreign direct inve-
stment (FDI), to date, Ukraine has received more or less significant amo-
unts of FDI from EU countries, while the scope of FDI from EU accession co-
untries is comparatively low, both in absolute and relative terms. The lat-
ter can be explained by the fact that outward FDI of most of these countries 
has been limited overall.
In principle, foreign investors enjoy either ‘nation’ or ‘most-favoured 
nation’ treatment. Additionally, Ukrainian rules and regulations grant spe-
cific privileges to foreign (as well as Ukrainian) companies investing in pro-
jects in the so-called Special Economic Zones and Priority Development Ter-
ritories.
Ukraine has recently taken clear steps towards a systemic improvement 
of the investment climate. However, quite extensive list of problems rema-
ins that must be addressed. Improvement of the investment climate must 
be seen as an integral part of further reform efforts. In order to improve the 
situation, Ukraine has to undertake significant efforts aimed at improving 
economic policy-making process in general and improve the regulatory envi-
ronment in specific sectors.
There is an urgent need to clearly delimit the two principal functions re-
garding policy-making in the field of FDI. These are, first, to ensure FDI re-
gulation by drafting relevant legislative and regulatory acts and norms, and, 
secondly, to establish and maintain direct relations with the actual and po-
tential investors, including assistance in solving problems related to establi-
shing, doing and terminating business in Ukraine. Such delimitation is ne-
cessary in order to assign the proper roles to different governmental agen-
cies and to consider the necessity of creating new institutions responsible 
for carrying out these two functions.
Ukraine should elaborate a coherent and consistently implemented in-
vestment promotion strategy. This strategy must be based on careful asses-
sment of the current state of the Ukrainian economy and international inve-
stment trends. Such a strategy would include the following tasks:
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•  developing a coherent investment promotion strategy to which all 
Ukrainian authorities subscribe;
•  simplifying interaction between foreign investors and Ukrainian autho-
rities by considering the creation, for instance, of a ‘one-stop shop’ that 
obtains for foreign investors all required licences, approvals and per-
mits from the authorities in charge; 
•  assisting foreign investors in case of difficulties with Ukrainian autho-
rities;
•  facilitating an ongoing and systematic policy dialogue between fore-
ign investors in Ukraine and investment policy makers;
•  enhancing both Ukraine’s image abroad as an attractive investment 
location and the image of foreign investment in Ukraine as an agent 
of growth;
• promoting investment projects in Ukraine abroad;
•  promoting linkages between foreign investors and domestic sup-
pliers.
4.1.3. Ukraine in the EU energy policy 
Energy supplies from Russia and the Caspian basin are increasingly impor-
tant for the EU, as its internal sources are depleted and demand for external 
sources of supply grows. Ukraine’s geographical location and available infra-
structure makes it an indispensable element in ensuring the EU’s security of 
energy supplies. However, geopolitical considerations are prominent in the 
energy policies of the CIS countries. In addition, the interests of upstream, 
transit and downstream countries sometimes might contradict each other. 
Therefore, the establishment of bilateral or in some cases trilateral dialogue 
between consuming, transiting and producing countries is needed in order 
to enhance the security of supply.
The EU-Ukraine relations in the energy sector should be built on the pro-
visions of the Energy Charter Treaty that envisages that relations are built 
on principles of non-discrimination and co-ordination of energy policies. 
The EU-Russia energy dialogue must be brought in line with this Treaty and 
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the INOGATE programme, which aims at developing regional strategies for 
the NIS countries in dealing with modernisation of existing energy oil and 
gas pipeline networks, and harmonisation of the partner states’ respective 
legislation with the EU energy standards. Similarly to the EU-Russia ener-
gy dialogue, the INOGATE programme should be intensified and more fo-
cused in the years to come on specific fields of co-operation, namely facili-
tating identification of appropriate transit energy routes from the Central 
Asia and Caspian basin to the EU markets through territories of Ukraine and 
the Visegrad countries. 
The three priorities of the Tacis Indicative Program 2002–2003 in the field 
of energy networks focus on supplies of Russian gas and oil to the EU. It is in 
common interest of the Visegrad countries, Ukraine and the EU that energy 
producer countries in Central Asia and Caspian basin also achieve status of 
strategic energy partners of the enlarged EU.
Transporting oil from the Caspian basin to Europe: the role of Ukra-
ine
Increase of oil production in Caspian basin raises the question of opti-
mal oil transportation route. The very crowded Bosphorus Straits will not 
allow handling additional oil in several years due to both congestion pro-
blems and Turkish anxieties on environmental security. 
After the completion of the Odessa–Brody pipeline, Ukraine has the re-
quired infrastructure to transport Caspian oil to Europe. Caspian oil-produ-
cing states have shown interest in pumping oil from Odessa to Europe. Cur-
rently, this is the route that would allow the Bosphorus to be bypassed and 
could be successfully realised due to the following factors:
•  the congestion of the Bosphorus Straits will prevent additional oil trans-
port from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean; 
•  increasing costs of transportation by sea/tanker due to enforcement 
of new EU regulations;
•  recognition by the European Commission of the pipeline as being of 
Pan-European importance.
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Russia prefers other options, and is lobbying for using the Odessa–Brody 
pipeline for Russian oil transported through the pipeline in the other direc-
tion – to Odessa and through the Bosphorus. Although pumping Russian oil 
in the southern direction would increase transit fees to the Ukrainian govern-
ment over the short-term, it might result in huge long-run losses. The com-
petition for Caspian oil transit is very strong and even the temporary trans-
port in a southern direction is likely to speed up the development of other 
routes bypassing the Bosphorus in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Ukraine should promote the Odessa–Brody connection as a means to 
transport Caspian oil to Europe, which would increase the diversity of trans-
portation routes and thus improve the energy security of the EU. The EU is 
expected to be a major consumer of Caspian oil, and Russian monopoly on 
its transit is not in the EU’s interests. In order to enhance its energy securi-
ty especially in new member states, the EU has to further promote the Ca-
spian oil transit thorough the Odessa–Brody pipeline as well its extension 
to Polish Płock, as proposed by Ukraine and Poland and supported by the 
European Commission.
In the current situation, the EU and Poland might provide help by promo-
ting the pipeline among European and US companies that have contracts on 
oil extraction in the Caspian basin. The first announcement regarding the si-
gning of a transport contract between an oil producer and European consu-
mers would be a huge step forward towards the success of the project. 
Natural gas transit to Europe
An increasing share of natural gas is being imported from Russia to the 
EU, mainly via Ukrainian territory. Ukraine has to prove that it will remain a 
reliable transit country. Although the illegal siphoning of gas was stopped 
in 2000, and the issue of Ukrainian import gas debts was solved, a number 
of additional steps should be taken. The absence of accidents in the past 
does not automatically mean that the interruption of natural gas supply will 
not happen in the future.
The EU might assist Ukraine in increasing reliability of gas transit through 
its territory. The technical audit of the Ukrainian gas transit system, financed 
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by EU in the framework of INNOGATE program, was an extremely useful step 
in this direction. However, the policy implications from such audits should 
be made more transparent and far-reaching. The results of a recent techni-
cal audit were not disclosed to either the EU or Ukrainian public, while they 
should be the road map for the rehabilitation and development of the sys-
tem. Full incorporation of the technical audit results into Ukrainian invest-
ment decisions would confirm Ukraine as a reliable transit partner. Therefo-
re, European and Ukrainian public should be widely informed on such stu-
dies and their implications.
The creation of an international natural gas consortium, which would 
operate Ukrainian pipelines, might be considered a step in the right direc-
tion. However, the process of its creation remains non-transparent, which 
limits the involvement of reliable Western investors. The inclusion of such 
investors would increase the availability of funding and persuade consu-
mers of the reliability of natural gas supply from CIS countries. In order to 
ensure energy security and diversification of natural gas supply, as well as 
to avoid possible tensions between partners, Ukraine should include addi-
tional provisions on gas transit through Ukrainian and Russian territory into 
the statutory documents of consortium as called for by the Energy Char-
ter Treaty. Moreover, the duration of the management contract, the invest-
ment obligations of the members of the consortium, the tariffs for Russian 
gas transit and import and their possible changes, employment guarante-
es and detailed procedure on withdrawal from the consortium in case of 
failure to fulfil its commitments should also be included in the consortium 
agreement.
The EU should further raise the issue on non-discriminatory gas trans-
it from Russia and the Caspian basin within the framework EU-Russia Ener-
gy Dialogue. As a major Russian trade partner, it has substantial leverage 
to negotiate with Russia over transit routes for the natural gas produced by 
Russian oil companies and coming from the Caspian basin according to the 
provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty.
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4.1.4. Transport 
Ukraine is included in only two of the ten Pan-European multi-modal 
transport corridors, as well as one of the three Pan-European Transport Are-
as. Only three of ten corridors connect Western Europe with Eastern Euro-
pe, while the remaining seven corridors are aimed at improving connec-
tions on the north-south axis. In order to integrate Ukraine more closely 
with the enlarged EU, the EU should place greater emphasis on east-west 
connections in general and those linking Ukraine directly to the EU in par-
ticular.
A recent report from the European Commission identifies several trans-
port projects connecting EU member states with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine 
and Moldova as ‘worthy of consideration’. However, the EU aims first of all 
at improving transport connections within the EU single market between 
member states, and none of the above-mentioned projects were included 
in a set of four lists of priority transport projects that should be implemen-
ted by 2020. The EU’s stated principle is that ‘selected projects have to be 
on a main trans-European axis of the enlarged Europe’. It is hard to imagine 
the ‘main trans-European axis of the enlarged Europe’ without cities such as 
Kyiv, Moscow or Minsk. The EU should therefore revise its priority projects 
to include transport networks in Ukraine. 
In order to extend the transport corridors between Europe, the Southern 
Caucasus and Central Asia, supported within the TRACECA program since 
1995, a parallel program for the EU and Ukraine would be a very important 
element in supporting economic co-operation and human contacts betwe-
en the EU and Eastern Europe. 
The objectives of a program which would link the TRACECA corridor with 
central and western Europe should be as follows: 
•  recognition of Ukraine’s needs in terms of transport and communi-
cation; 
•  identification of those investments that would best contribute to 
the improvement of communication between EU member states and 
their Eastern neighbours; 
77
The Enlarged EU and Ukraine
– New Relations. Final Report
•  providing expert support to projects of specific measures; 
•  helping to find investors (also among the financial institutions). Such 
a program would fit into the idea of increasing the capacity of the Eu-
rasian transport corridors, as designed by the EU. 
4.2. JHA and Labour Market Access 
4.2.1. Friendly Border Policy
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is of growing importance for the EU and 
also for Ukraine’s integration with the EU. The co-ordination of a whole array 
of legal, administrative and technical measures between the EU and Ukraine 
should take place under the scheme of the Friendly Border Policy aiming at 
fostering closer ties, through, amongst others, eliminating barriers to the 
movement of people while at the same time enhancing security. This Poli-
cy requires the commitment and concerted efforts of both parties, without 
which it will be impossible to establish mutual trust.
Ukraine needs to implement domestic reforms aimed at improving its 
internal security and fulfilling its obligations toward the EU in order to be-
come a trustworthy partner. Ukraine has to pay considerable attention to 
secure its borders and strengthen its law enforcement mechanisms in or-
der to be a credible partner. Also, Ukraine needs to demonstrate its com-
mitment by adopting asymmetrical solutions towards the EU wherever po-
ssible. For example, Ukraine should reconsider its visa policy vis-à-vis the 
EU and unilaterally remove visa requirements for EU citizens. Furthermore, 
Ukraine needs to adopt the following measures: concluding a readmission 
agreement with the Schengen Group, more vigorous implementation of exi-
sting readmission agreements with Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and gre-
ater efforts in fighting cross-border crime such as human trafficking, smug-
gling of illegal immigrants, drugs and arms. At the same time, it is also im-
portant that Ukrainian border services become more efficient and custo-
mer-oriented to counteract the perception of being a backward, post-So-
viet country which treats visitors as a nuisance. 
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The focus on the formation of the EU as a community of ‘internal 
security’ has forced insistence on the security a tight external border. 
This has led to the lack of consistency between border security and the 
pursuit of the CFSP, which aims to foster closer ties with countries like 
Ukraine. Therefore, to overcome this discrepancy, the management of 
external border and immigration policy, which affects lives of many or-
dinary citizens in neighbouring countries, should be a priority requiring 
comprehensive review. Results of such a review should help to formula-
te precisely the content of the Friendly Border Policy. This will be high-
ly symbolic as well as a genuinely tangible expression of the will of an 
enlarged European Union to engage in special relationships with its di-
rect neighbours. 
Amongst other measures, the creation of a friendly border requires 
the application of a variety of legal, administrative and technical measu-
res, which would facilitate travel to EU countries and ensure fast and effi-
cient arrangements at the external border. The crucial challenge is to im-
plement a friendly border agenda while maintaining the security functions 
that are so essential to the external frontier. Such a compromise has tradi-
tionally been perceived as a commendable idea but impossible to put into 
practice without undermining security. To achieve both objectives, a more 
sophisticated approach toward immigration by the EU is needed while re-
liance on traditional anti-immigration components of external border re-
gime are decreased. 
4.2.2. Movement of people – visa issues 
The overarching objective in Ukraine-EU relations should be the removal 
of barriers to the movement of people between the enlarged EU and Ukra-
ine. In the short term, this requires mitigating the negative consequences 
of the introduction of visas by the new member states and easing entry re-
quirements. Visa-free travel between Ukraine and the EU should be the stra-
tegic goal of integration. For example, the concept of visa-free travel as a 
long-term objective has been repeatedly raised in the context of EU-Russia 
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relations since 2002, and should also be proclaimed for Ukraine. Even tho-
ugh no time-line can be specified at this time for the EU side, the EU sho-
uld spell out the list of conditions that Ukraine needs to fulfil in order to be 
taken off the Schengen ‘black’ visa list, similar to the way the issue was ap-
proached in cases of Romania and Bulgaria. In the meantime, the EU and 
Ukraine should adopt a variety of short and medium-term measures. They 
are outlined in the following sections.
Redefining visas 
Visas are widely cherished both by public opinion and government of-
ficials as a safeguard against unwanted immigration and cross-border cri-
me. While this instrument is known to be largely ineffective in this respect, 
it has become so ubiquitous that alternatives tend to be dismissed out of 
hand. In cases of the EU and Ukraine, the burden that visa procedures cre-
ate for both parties is significant. EU member states need to commit consi-
derable administrative and financial resources to secure efficient functioning 
of consular services in Ukraine and, taking into account the size of Ukraine, 
they should have consular outposts in other locations if they care about the 
quality of service to Ukrainian nationals. As this is not the case at present, 
the lengthy and cumbersome process of getting a visa is one of the most 
important factors contributing to the prevailing feeling of being discrimi-
nated against, being regarded as second-class Europeans, among the po-
pulation of Ukraine. 
Introduction of visas by the new member states – an obvious step under 
Schengen flanking measures – is perhaps perceived as the single most im-
portant consequence of EU enlargement by Ukrainian society, which direc-
tly contributes to ambivalent feelings towards that process. Nearly ten times 
more border crossings were recorded between Ukraine and its western ne-
ighbours, on the basis of non-visa regulation in 2002, than visits to the cur-
rent EU member states. Due to its practical and symbolic importance, allevia-
ting negative consequences of visa regimes and neutralising lingering fears 
should be one of the key elements of EU policy towards Ukraine. While the 
elimination of visas for Ukraine should become one of the main long-term 
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strategic goals of the EU’s policy towards Ukraine, in the short-term the cru-
cial challenge is to make visas easily accessible. 
Lodging and examining visa applications
Reduction of queues and shortening of the average time between sub-
mitting an application and collecting a visa should be one of the operatio-
nal priorities of the Friendly Border Policy. These issues should be the sub-
jects of regular consular co-operation. A variety of organisational and tech-
nical measures, which could help to achieve the following measures, sho-
uld be adopted:
•  visa applications that could be downloaded from the consulates’ we-
bsites
•  the possibility to submit an application by mail or via a tourist agen-
cy 
•  ‘one stop visa’: possibility to submit documents and collect visas the 
same day
•  introduction of time limits for consular officials for processing visa ap-
plications (e.g. two days)
•  introducing a numbered queue system, or appointments at a specific 
time, to reduce queuing, where necessary. 
The introduction of such measures will require improvements in the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), and of other data collection systems, 
to enable the immediate verification and comparison of data. Personal in-
terviews and requirements for supporting documentation should not be 
considered a general rule but rather an exception. Alternatively, such ‘re-
gular’ procedures could be conducted only when a person applies for a 
Schengen visa for the first time and then the visa could be issued imme-
diately after an interview. Otherwise, visas should be issued in a simpli-
fied procedure unless there is evidence of a prior illegal stay on  Schen-
gen territory, record of criminal activities or other obviously negative con-
siderations. 
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Local border traffic visa
The Commission’s recent proposals on simplified local border traffic (for 
nationals who reside in border areas of countries the nationals of which are 
not exempted from visa requirement) is a promising departure from current 
Schengen inflexibility. 
Development of acquis on local border traffic, with respect to neighbo-
uring countries such as Ukraine, could become not only a practical tool that 
will make the life of people living in border regions much easier, but also 
an important political gesture giving very positive input into EU-Ukraine re-
lations. In order to fully utilise this potential, local border traffic should be 
translated into legislation and then operationalised not too long after the 
introduction of visas by Poland and Hungary in autumn 2003. It would be 
advisable to issue a policy declaration on the part of the EU confirming its 
will to put in place such mechanism. In order for the future EU-Ukraine re-
lations to be meaningful, local border traffic should not be limited to 50 km 
from the border but should cover the whole of regions adjacent to the EU’s 
external border. Such a solution would help to match the possible demand 
and minimise the abuse. Its effective implementation could alleviate fears 
among the current member states and set the ground for liberalisation of is-
suance of standard Schengen visas to Ukraine under the framework of Frien-
dly Border Policy. A similar approach to long-term national visas paves the 
way to elimination of visas in the future. 
European Consular infrastructure
The consular networks of EU countries will expand as the result of en-
largement, at the same time however, the demand for visas will sharply 
rise as all of Ukraine’s western neighbours will require visas. In the frame-
work of the Wider Europe initiative it seems legitimate and rational for 
both new and old EU members to think in terms of EU consular infrastruc-
ture, which should be adequately developed along the EU’s external land 
border. Such policy could be developed gradually. The first step could be 
co-ordination between consulates of EU member states to allow Ukrainian 
citizens apply for visa at the nearest consular outpost, irrespective of what 
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is the main country of destination. (according to the Schengen acquis this 
is currently possible only in exceptional circumstances) The second step 
would be to introduce Euro Consulates, as a visible expression of good-ne-
ighbourly policy. A pilot Euro Consulate could be opened in Lviv, the main 
city of western Ukraine, just 70 km from the border of the enlarged EU. 
Such a consulate would not only provide efficient visa service on behalf 
of all member states but could also serve as an EU information and reso-
urce centre accessible to students, local officials, NGOs, business people 
and general public. Last but not least, it could be the testing ground for 
direct co-operation of national consular services and the feasibility of the-
ir potential integration.
Consular infrastructure should be increasingly seen as a common re-
sponsibility. Financial burden sharing should not be limited only to the fu-
ture project of Euro Consulates but should support new member countries 
that would be primarily responsible for implementing the Friendly Border 
Policy, i.e. adequately equipped consular services. 
Shifting balance from visas to border checks
Technological and organisational advancements already allow to shift 
the balance for protection of borders to border checks in the medium-term. 
These include an improved quality of information within the SIS, wide use of 
portable terminals with instant access to SIS, easy-to-use magnetic readers 
for passports with a magnetic code and the technical ability to print visa 
stickers, as part of the passport verification process. Such improvements co-
uld limit the use of traditional visas issued by consulates only to two cate-
gories of persons: those who travel for the first time and have to undergo 
regular visa procedure and those who want to reduce the risk of refusal of 
entry, and the related losses due to the travel expenses incurred, and the-
refore prefer to apply for a visa in the traditional manner. The inspection of 
passport documents with the use of a reader while travelling in both direc-
tions, would allow an immediate determination of whether the duration of 
the visit had been exceeded. 
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Ukraine’s reciprocal measures
Facilitated access to visas, involving policy and institutional modifications 
by the EU, requires reciprocal activities on the part of Ukraine that demon-
strate its genuine interest in co-operation. Ukrainian policy-makers have to 
come to terms and communicate to the public that traditional reciprocity, 
based on full symmetry, cannot be the case in relations with the EU, as is in-
deed already the case with trade barriers. The first promising step has been 
already made: Poland and Ukraine concluded an agreement whereby Polish 
citizens will continue to enjoy visa-free travel to Ukraine, while Ukrainian ci-
tizens will be granted multi-entry Polish visas free of charge. 
Such arrangement could be a model solution for relations between all 
EU countries and Ukraine. Because the EU requires visas from Ukrainian ci-
tizens, Ukraine also requires visas of EU citizens, regardless of the ‘objecti-
ve’ need for such control measures. However, the principle of asymmetry, 
with the removal of visa requirements for EU citizens travelling to Ukraine 
before visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens travelling to the EU are li-
fted, should be adopted by Ukraine, as has been the case with some Bal-
kan countries. Even if EU visa requirements have not been lifted for Ser-
bia–Montenegro, the latter has removed the visa requirement for EU citi-
zens. This measure would form a vital step towards visa-free regime betwe-
en Ukraine and the EU.
In addition, Ukraine should adopt other measures in preparation for 
the visa free regime with the EU. Ukrainian passports should be technolo-
gically upgraded to reduce the risk of successful counterfeit and falsifica-
tion. While the standards of border controls and border surveillance with 
Russia do not directly concern potential privileges for holders of Ukrainian 
passports, they are of crucial importance to the overall credibility of Ukra-
ine as a partner in preventing and fighting new security threats related to 
illegal migration, cross-border crime and terrorism. A time-table for develo-
ping border infrastructure with Russia should be developed and observed. 
Taking into account improved EU-Russia relations it should not necessarily 
create tension in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Furthermore, investments into 
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Ukraine’s northern and eastern borders should be supported by the EU to 
reflect their importance for overall European security. 
4.2.3. Labour force accession
Access for the citizens from non-EU member states to legal jobs in the 
European Union is possible but limited. At present, regulation of labour mi-
gration remains the prerogative of individual member states, and central EU 
bodies have limited competencies in this field, even though the formation 
of an EU-wide policy in the field of external labour migration is envisaged. 
Therefore, there will be a transition of regulating mechanisms from the bi-
lateral to EU-Ukraine level. 
In relations between the EU and non-member states a number of pre-
cedents have already been set solving the problem of temporary job place-
ment of these states’ citizens. These provisions should be extended to Ukra-
ine. Both Ukraine and the EU need to adopt regulations that would corre-
spond to the situation in Ukraine and EU’s labour markets. 
Ukraine and the EU should develop and sign an agreement on mutual 
protection of labour markets. The agreement should provide transparent 
and stable opportunities for legal job placement for citizens of Ukraine, as 
well as liability for rendering assistance for a guest workers’ timely return to 
Ukraine and observance of all contract provisions. Labour migration should 
be facilitated by the creation, through joint efforts, of a database of orga-
nisations and enterprises acting as intermediaries (from both sides) betwe-
en job seekers from Ukraine and employers from the EU. Legal terms sho-
uld be defined, and reciprocal agreements should be signed, to avoid do-
uble taxation of guest workers. 
EU member states should create opportunities for legal temporary job 
placement for citizens of Ukraine by establishing quotas as for its individual 
countries, taking into consideration the needs of corresponding segments of 
labour markets. These quotas can be seasonal, sectoral and/or general. The 
size of the quotas can be the subject of negotiations carried out by experts, 
with subsequent submission to government approval.
85
The Enlarged EU and Ukraine
– New Relations. Final Report
Ukrainian authorities should elaborate and introduce an integrated ap-
proach to exit labour migration. This needs to include: the collection and pu-
blication of reliable statistical data on exit labour migration; assessment of 
regions in Ukraine where exit migration is greatest; combat crime connec-
ted with organisation of illegal exit migration, including giving of spurio-
us visas, invitations, and sham contracts; create facilities to harness positive 
experiences of labour migrants who return to Ukraine, such as centres for 
innovation and entrepreneurship that would provide help in starting one’s 
own business, investment of the funds, searching of partners and so forth. 
As part of reciprocal measures vis-à-vis the EU, Ukraine should facilitate ac-
cess to its own labour market for EU citizens by easing bureaucratic require-
ments, such as registration etc.
NGOs in the EU and Ukraine could play a significant role in this field by 
carrying out information campaigns aiming to highlight legal opportunities 
for labour migration to the EU member states, as well as the potential dan-
gers awaiting illegal migrants. They should also engage in the protection of 
rights of the workers in the EU.
Enhancing opportunities for temporary labour migration will decrease 
permanent migration and existing widespread abuses of the visa system by 
Ukrainian nationals. Many citizens of Ukraine use tourism, studies, business 
or family visits as a pretext to obtain a visa but in fact are going to work. In 
most cases they have no intention of immigrating to an EU country, but ra-
ther go to find temporary employment (often in informal sectors of econo-
my due to restrictions placed on labour migration). This is a specific featu-
re of migration from the EU’s neighbours to the EU. As long as Ukrainians 
retain the possibility of obtaining employment for specific periods of time, 
with the possibility of periodically returning home, they tend not be incli-
ned to become traditional immigrants and make every effort possible to 
maintain legal status. Therefore, by providing easy access to visas, EU mem-
ber states minimise the risk of many Ukrainians falling into the trap of ille-
gal migration. 
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4.2.4. Border management
Development and upgrading of border crossings
The effects of investments on the EU-Ukrainian border (often with EU 
funding) are frequently limited, as they are not matched by similar efforts 
on the Ukrainian side of the border infrastructure. Lack of financial resour-
ces has resulted in a bottleneck phenomenon: the wide lanes and upgra-
ded border facilities on the EU side of the new EU-Ukrainian border that are 
not available on the Ukrainian side. The incompatibility of border facilities, 
combined with inflexible, less service-oriented approach of Ukrainian bor-
der services, results in long waiting times and poor service on the border, 
irrespective of how well-developed the infrastructure on the new member 
states’ side of the border is. 
The new funding, committed by the EU for tightening of the external bor-
der to candidate countries and raised during Copenhagen summit (Decem-
ber 2002), is almost entirely directed toward border surveillance and securi-
ty standards of border checks. Capacity of border crossings, in terms of the 
number of people who could cross the border in a reasonable amount of 
time, has traditionally not been an issue of concern for EU officials respon-
sible for Schengen acquis. 
Improving standards of border crossing and reducing waiting times at 
the border should become key objectives of the Friendly Border Policy. The-
re would be three main instruments to achieve this objective: expansion of 
border facilities on the Ukrainian side of the border, establishment of the 
new border crossings and measures that would improve the efficiency of 
Ukrainian border guards. The enlarged EU should engage financially in the 
process of developing infrastructure of the existing border crossings on the 
Ukrainian side of the border and support the establishment of new bor-
der-crossing points.
Implementation of agreements on joint border-checks should become 
standard because it reduces overall waiting time on the border, puts pres-
sure on counterparts not to slow down controls and more generally helps 
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to change mentality. Last but not least, it could reduce corruption. Based on 
the successful model of Polish-German co-operation, where officials from the 
Polish and German Border Guards closely collaborate, similar contact points 
should be established on the future EU-Ukraine border. Specific measures 
within the Friendly Border Policy should also provide for the elimination of 
all Soviet style features of border procedures, such as iron gates that are still 
used on the Ukrainian border crossing to regulate the traffic. 
EU responsibility for external borders
A pro-active policy on European borders, which wisely combines ele-
ments of control with facilitating cross-border movement, has to become 
the responsibility of the EU as a whole, and not just that of the countries 
along its external frontier. The idea of European border guards could be a 
positive step forward. The placement of individual officers from the mem-
ber states in border guard units on the EU’s external borders could be an ef-
fective instrument of fostering the concept of common European responsi-
bility and promote mutual trust between member states. Placement of bor-
der guards from member states other than Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
on the Ukrainian-EU border would have a positive long-term educational ef-
fect, bringing a specific neighbourly perspective to the mind-set of border 
officials across the EU. 
4.2.5. Co-operation between law enforcement agencies 
Human trafficking, notably of women for prostitution and children for 
sexual exploitation, money laundering, arms and drug smuggling are im-
portant international crimes in the EU, some of which originate in Ukraine 
and/or involve Ukrainian nationals. 
Counteracting these soft security threats requires intensive collabora-
tion between the EU and Ukraine. Organised criminal groups are increasin-
gly operating across borders and are forming international networks to as-
sist their criminal activity; this calls for a strengthening of co-operation be-
tween law enforcement authorities within the European Union and Ukraine 
in order to develop appropriate response. 
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An effective approach to these problems should include common mo-
nitoring, both counteractive and preventive measures, based upon mutual 
information access and permanent co-ordination of actions, including the 
following:
•  the strengthening of co-operation in identifying, freezing, seizing, con-
fiscating and possible sharing or returning of assets, the prevention 
and control of money laundering, the counterfeiting of documents and 
currency, trafficking in and smuggling of persons, illegal immigration, 
illegal trafficking in drugs, trafficking in stolen property (including for 
instance motor vehicles and cultural artefacts), computer related cri-
mes including those using the Internet, high technology crime, cor-
ruption and economic crime.
•  Monitoring of ‘risky’ businesses, in particular, mediation in job place-
ment, which often serves as a cover for human trafficking.
•  Co-operation in the detection of ‘chains’ of women trafficking for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation, both directly from Ukraine to EU and 
through the Balkans or Turkey, as well as women from third countries 
passing through Ukrainian territory. 
•  Continuation of financial and legislative monitoring, which aims to push 
Ukraine to European standards in the struggle against money launde-
ring with a clear perspective of Ukraine’s full membership in FATF.
•  Strengthening co-operation within the framework of intergovernmen-
tal organisations, such as the United Nations, the International Cri-
minal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), the World Customs Organisa-
tion, the Baltic Sea Task Force Against Organised Crime and the Buda-
pest Group.
In addition, the EU should consider the following measures: 
•  Engaging Ukraine in the activities of the EU’s multilateral bodies in 
the sphere of law-enforcement – such as Europol (exchange of ope-
rative information); European Police Chiefs’ Task Force (top-level in-
ter-personal communication); European Police College (training of 
personnel).
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•  Inclusion of Ukraine into newly established networks – such as the 
European Crime Prevention Network and Crime Prevention Forum, 
which were launched in 2001, with the aim of spreading knowledge 
of best-practice policing methods and bringing together all the people 
interested in the fight against crime right across Europe.
•  Inviting Ukraine into permanent programmes of police co-operation 
– such as the OISIN programme to enhance co-operation between law-
enforcement agencies; the STOP II programme to increase contacts 
between professionals working to tackle trafficking in human beings; 
the Falcone scheme for the training and exchange of people fighting 
organised crime and the Octopus programme to tackle corruption in 
East-Central Europe.
In addition to the recommendations in the sections on ‘Legal and Judi-
cial Reforms’ and ‘Rule of Law’, Ukraine should carry out the following me-
asures:
•  fully implement legislation necessary for Ukraine’s entry into FATF;
•  carry out anti-corruption programs in the law-enforcement and judi-
cial systems; 
•  create and realise a governmental program on overcoming human traf-
ficking and sexual exploitation;
•  combat crime connected with the organisation of illegal migration, in-
cluding providing false visas, invitations, and contracts;  
•  create adaptation centres for victims of human trafficking returning 
to Ukraine from abroad.  
4.3. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/ 
          European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
4.3.1. EU-Ukraine dialogue on foreign, security 
           and defence policy
EU foreign policy has developed considerably since the main elements 
of EU-Ukraine relations were established in the first half of the 1990s. Altho-
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ugh integration is still lagging behind in this field compared with other po-
licy areas, the development of the EU’s CFSP in recent years provide consi-
derable scope for enhanced EU-Ukraine co-operation. Indeed, foreign, secu-
rity and defence policies are areas where Ukraine could make a significant 
contribution to EU policies. 
The first (modest) strengthening of the CFSP were introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, and include the establishment of a High Representati-
ve for CFSP with a policy unit for early warning and policy planning, a new 
EU policy instrument, the Common Strategies, and the incorporation of the 
West European Union into the EU framework. This was followed by the es-
tablishment of the ESDP, consisting of an EU force of 60 000 troops to be 
deployed for so-called Petersberg tasks (peacekeeping, humanitarian ope-
rations, etc.). The proposed EU constitution includes a proposal to create 
of an EU foreign minister, and the EU has recently elaborated its first EU 
security strategy. 
An elaborate mechanism for consultation and dialogue between the EU 
and third countries has been established as part of the ESDP. These struc-
tures have been created mainly for non-EU NATO members and EU acces-
sion candidates, although a separate dialogue has also been established 
with Russia. The structured security dialogue takes place in two formats: 
15+6 and 15+152, with more extensive consultation in the former format. 
Consultations with Russia are more frequent, but involve only the EU tro-
ika, and only take place at the level of senior officials. An agreement was 
reached in 2002 on establishing a Ukrainian military liaison to the EU Mili-
tary Staff in Brussels.
Ukraine should be included in the EU’s structured security dialogue with 
third countries. A revision of the current format will in any case be required 
after the 2004 enlargements of the EU and NATO. The two separate formats 
currently in place will for instance become redundant, with both configura-
2 15+6 refers to the 15 EU member states and the six  non-EU NATO members Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic Iceland, Norway and Turkey. 15+15 includes also the remaining 9 
EU candidates. 
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tions becoming the same: 25+53. One could here easily envisage the inclu-
sion of Ukraine in this numerically diminished group of associated non-EU 
states.
The candidate countries, as well as other European countries, frequen-
tly associate themselves with EU foreign policy declarations (the so-called 
CFSP statements), adding further weight to the statements. To this end, the 
EU should consult with the potential associates before issuing the declara-
tion, further adding to the dialogue between them. Ukraine should be con-
sulted on these statements, and be given the opportunity to regularly asso-
ciate itself with EU foreign policy declarations. One could also consider con-
sultations and common positions in international organisations like the UN, 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
4.3.2. Participation of Ukraine in ESDP operations  
Although the EU member states had made only limited progress towards 
achieving the so-called ‘Headline Goals’ by the end of 2002, the ESDP was 
declared ‘operational’ on schedule on 1 January 2003. This followed a last-mi-
nute agreement on EU-NATO relations and the participation of third coun-
tries – the so-called Berlin Plus agreement – before the Copenhagen sum-
mit in December 2002. Three operations have so far been initiated, with two 
still ongoing as of late autumn 2003:
The first ESDP operation – the EU police mission in Bosnia – started on 1 
January 2003 for an initial period of three years, taking over from the UN’s 
police task force. The aim is to establish sustainable policing arrangements 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina through monitoring, mentoring and inspection ac-
tivities. The operation consists of more than 500 police officers from over 
thirty countries: the fifteen EU Member States as well as eighteen other co-
untries. Ukraine participates with five police officers. 
The second operation – named Concordia – was launched in Macedonia 
on 31 March 2003. Initially intended to last for six months, this has curren-
3 The 25 refer to the EU member states as of 1 May 2004. The five are Iceland, Norway, Tur-
key, Romania and Bulgaria.
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tly been extended until mid-December 2003. The operation includes 350 
military personnel from 27 countries. All EU member states except Den-
mark and Ireland participate in the mission, as well as fourteen non-EU 
countries. 
Operation Artemis was conducted in eastern Congo from 12 June to 1 
September 2003, with France taking the lead as the ‘framework nation’. The 
operation included approximately 1 800 troops. Thirteen EU member states 
(excluding Luxembourg and Denmark), as well as four non-EU states, con-
tributed to the operation.
Ukraine offers considerable potential as a contributor to ESDP opera-
tions, beyond the five Ukrainian police officers involved in the EU’s police 
mission in Bosnia. First, Ukraine has considerable experience in internatio-
nal peacekeeping operations. Ukraine participated in peacekeeping missions 
in the Balkans from the very beginning of international operations there. 
The Ukrainian military contributed international efforts in Croatia, Bosnia, 
Macedonia and Kosovo (KFOR). Ukrainian peacekeepers are involved now 
in international forces in Lebanon and Sierra-Leone under the framework of 
the UN. Currently Ukraine is involved in military operation in Iraq, having fi-
fth largest contingent there.
Secondly, Ukraine could make a notable logistical contribution in areas 
where the EU is unable to reach its own requirements. One should in this 
context mention Ukraine’s contribution in the military operation in Afgha-
nistan in 2001–2003. Ukrainian military transport aircraft were required to 
move European (primarily German) military units and equipment to Afgha-
nistan. The success of this effort was the reason why nine European NATO 
members decided in June 2003 to lease Ukrainian Antonov transport aircraft 
on a permanent basis. The crucial role of Ukrainian air transport capabili-
ty proved during Afghanistan operation should be further politically expo-
sed and used to promote the image of Ukraine as a contributor to the ESDP 
as well as to NATO. 
In cases where operations in the former Soviet Union are to be conside-
red – as is now the case for Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict – Ukra-
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ine is politically well situated to play a central and perhaps bridge-building 
role in cases where Russian participation is politically difficult and where 
Russian sensitivities prevent EU-only operations. A more active EU policy to-
wards the dispute in Georgia (Abkhazia) could for instance benefit from clo-
ser co-operation with Ukraine. In these cases Ukraine also has a linguistic 
advantage of use to the EU. Ukraine’s geographical location also makes it 
potentially useful for logistical purposes in case of operations in for instan-
ce the Caucasus or Central Asia.
Although Ukraine could already today make these contributions, the po-
tential for EU-Ukraine co-operation on ESDP would be greatly enhanced by 
the rapid transformation and modernisation of Ukraine’s armed forces. This 
potential is likely to grow steadily over the coming years and not be fully re-
alised until the medium- or long-term. 
4.4. Civil Society 
4.4.1. EU assistance to Ukrainian Civil Society
In addition to Tacis, non-governmental organisations and academic in-
stitutions can obtain support from the European Commission under the Eu-
ropean Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Since 1993, 55 
micro-projects and 70 macro-projects have been implemented in Ukraine 
and most of the grants were received by NGOs. 
However, in comparison with US funds working in Ukraine, support 
from the EU is much less available for the Ukrainian third sector. EIDHR 
competition takes place only once a year and its procedures are time-con-
suming (considering projects and realising contracts takes up to eight mon-
ths). Governmental and private American organisations work in Ukraine 
in various directions, while priorities of the EC programmes which can be 
used by Ukrainian NGOs are less differentiated by topics and their rules are 
less flexible. That is one of the reasons for which international co-opera-
tion of Ukrainian NGOs is very much US-oriented and support from the EU 
and member states plays a lesser role. Many initiatives that are focused on 
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EU-Ukraine co-operation and promotion of the EU in Ukraine are still sup-
ported by US funds.
The international co-operation of Ukrainian NGOs should be broade-
ned and diversified. Various projects of Ukrainian NGOs implemented in 
the last years through support of US institutions, closely coincide with EU 
priorities for Ukraine (human rights advocacy, freedom of media, monito-
ring of election process) and could be supported in the framework of the 
EIDHR. While US engagement in supporting civil society in Ukraine, espe-
cially for initiatives related to political (or politicised) issues, is at times 
met with suspicion EU engagement would be perceived as rather neutral. 
Requirements of European Commission programmes could also have a po-
sitive impact on the Ukrainian third sector as organisations, while trying 
to meet these requirements, would increase their knowledge and under-
standing of the EU. 
In order to improve availability of the EU assistance and enhance the 
capacity of Ukrainian NGOs to absorb it effectively the following measures 
should be adopted:
•  to co-ordinate information policy of the European Commission Dele-
gation to Ukraine with activity of member states in Ukraine (such as 
embassies, consulates and cultural institutes). For example, a network 
of British Council offices in four cities of Ukraine could be used for in-
formation meetings and dissemination of publications on EU assistan-
ce programmes; 
•  to promote information on EU programmes through various Euro-
pean funds and organisations working in Ukraine. All of them could 
co-operate in publicising  information about EU programmes and abo-
ut the results of projects implemented in Ukraine with assistance from 
the EU;
•  to use internet resources used by Ukrainian NGOs: pages on informa-
tion portals for NGOs and on web-pages of resources centres devoted 
especially to the topic of co-operation between the EU and the Ukra-
inian third sector;
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•  to create databases of projects supported through EU programmes, 
promotion of the results of these projects in NGO newsletters and in 
this manner sharing experiences between NGOs that participated suc-
cessfully in EU programs;
•  to elaborate special training programmes for NGOs that would incre-
ase their capacities; 
•  to provide information on Ukraine and its third sector intended espe-
cially for European donors and NGOs available through Ukrainian em-
bassies in the EU countries and vice versa.  
4.4.2. Involvement of Ukrainian NGOs in co-operation 
           on the pan-European and regional levels
Ukrainian NGOs are weakly engaged in international co-operation. De-
spite the fact that they have numerous contacts with western partners, this 
is, to a large extent, a donor-recipient relationship. 
There is a need for co-ordination between governmental and non-go-
vernmental bodies, which provide assistance to Ukraine. Clear and co-ordi-
nated information policy about all opportunities offered by a given country 
for NGOs, media organisations, academic institutions and individuals sho-
uld be provided. Co-operation between the British Embassy, Department for 
International Development and the British Council in Ukraine can serve as 
an example of well-co-ordinated activities.
Given the current needs of Ukraine, further development of programmes 
focused on promotion of democratic institutions and procedures and on po-
litical education is required. As the German example shows, this is the role 
that European foundations can successfully play by involving in their pro-
jects Ukrainian policy-makers, think tanks and academic circles.
Another field of co-operation should be assistance in better linking 
the third sector with the whole of society. Notwithstanding the growing 
number of NGOs in Ukraine, which demonstrates development of the 
third sector, knowledge about NGOs and their activities remains low in 
the society and there is a threat of self-isolation of organisations from 
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their environment. European NGOs could provide their Ukrainian part-
ners with models and methods how NGOs can work in and for commu-
nity and to promote good standards and a high degree of professiona-
lism in the third sector.
Regional co-operation is especially well developed between the Ukra-
inian third sector and Poland and Slovakia. Thanks to geographical and lin-
guistic proximity, contacts with both these countries are easy to establish 
and maintain. Over ten years of co-operation between Ukraine’s third sec-
tor with neighbouring countries resulted in a network of contacts with or-
ganisations, institutions and individuals. East-Central European partners are 
important for the Ukrainian third sector, not only because there are the ne-
arest or because they can serve as intermediaries in co-operation with the 
West, but because they have unique experiences of transformation, which 
can be adapted to Ukrainian conditions. For this reason, promotion of East-
East partnership in grant making programmes open for Ukraine is of a gre-
at importance. Some practices and forms used in Ukrainian-Polish and Ukra-
inian-Slovak co-operation should be especially recommended, as they resul-
ted in multiplied effects: 
•  Internships in several small, local organisations co-ordinated by one 
experienced NGO. Contacts established this way resulted in starting in-
ternational co-operation by local NGOs and further bilateral projects 
with the Ukrainian partner;
•  Co-operation between universities and NGOs. Fellowship programmes 
and internships offered to students from Ukraine should include the 
presentation of the third sector in the given country. This creates a ne-
twork of links, which can be used in the interns’ further professional 
and public activity. 
•  Joint projects in the CIS area. Implementation of the results of bilate-
ral Polish-Ukrainian or Slovak-Ukrainian projects in further work with 
organisations from Central Asia turned out to be especially successful. 
Ukrainian NGOs can also play an important role in developing co-ope-
ration with Belarus. 
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•  Involving NGOs from Ukraine in bilateral projects with west European 
partners. Polish organisations served in this manner as intermediaries 
between Ukrainian NGOs (which were sometimes not experienced eno-
ugh to establish contacts with West European partners by themselves) 
and organisations from Germany (which sometimes were not intere-
sted in establishing direct contacts with Ukraine).
4.4.3. Searching for a model of efficient NGO collaboration
Organisational structures that already exist on regional level may be mo-
dified to strengthen international co-operation. There exist two structures 
whose experiences can be used: the Open Society Institutes (OSI) and the 
Regional Environmental Centres (REC) for Central and Eastern Europe that 
have offices in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia (as well as in other CIS 
countries). OSI has a network of organisations throughout East-Central Eu-
rope and the CIS, which would facilitate co-operation between Ukraine and 
its neighbours, while the RECs also provide a framework for international 
co-operation. Some European foundations also have their offices througho-
ut the region (for example, the Konrad Adenauer and the Friedrich Ebert Sti-
ftung foundations) but unlike OSI or REC, they do not conduct regional pro-
grams. However, they could:
•  co-ordinate their work in Kyiv, Warsaw, Bratislava and Hungary,
•  conduct projects under two or more countries offices (joint seminars, 
research projects) involving partners from the region,
•  conduct (regular) meetings (conferences, etc.) focused on regional is-
sues.
There are pan-European NGO structures that can be more effectively used 
by Ukrainian organisations. There are three projects of the European Foun-
dation Centre (EFC): Grantmakers East Group, Orpheus Civil Society Project 
and Enlargement Task Force. As the most important European link for do-
nors, EFC provides Ukraine’s third sector with the opportunity of represen-
tation and participation on European level. At present, there is only one do-
nor organisation from Ukraine, the International Renaissance Foundation, 
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which fulfils EFC membership criteria and participates in the network. Ho-
wever, Ukrainian NGOs could actively use the EFC structure for dialogue with 
European partners by creating a coalition of the third sector, which could 
co-operate with Ukrainian representatives in the EFC (at least, as some kind 
of consultative body).
Ukraine’s membership in the EFC is desirable since it would give the po-
ssibility to participate in discussions concerning donor strategy for the New 
Europe and present the expectations of the Ukrainian third sector. 
On the regional level, Ukrainian NGOs should more actively use informa-
tion and communication opportunities offered by the Orpheus Civil Socie-
ty Project and involve other organisations into the network. Moreover, the 
resource centres should try to become Orpheus CSP Centres or Information 
Points. This status can be achieved by complying with certain technical re-
quirements and general criteria. 
The development of indigenous Ukrainian donors is a long-term priori-
ty. International co-operation of Ukrainian NGOs would be more intensive 
if the financial contribution in bilateral projects by Ukrainian partners was 
increased. It is especially important for the further development of co-ope-
ration with East-Central European countries since, following their accession 
to the EU, opportunities to support co-operation with Ukraine will conside-
rably abate owing to the withdrawal of US funds.  
4.4.4. Education
Assistance for higher education institutions in Ukraine is provided in the 
framework of the Tempus programme, which supports partnerships and mo-
bility between universities in the EU and the NIS countries. At present, 20 
Joint European projects are being implemented in Ukraine. New opportu-
nities will arise when the new scheme of the Tempus, Structural and Com-
plementation Measures, launches in 2004. It is designed for short-term pro-
jects (up to one year) and has simplified application requirements. These 
opportunities should be used to strengthen co-operation and exchange be-
tween academic circles from Ukraine and the EU. Regional co-operation in 
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education has been developed in various forms, especially with Polish uni-
versities and NGOs. 
Support for education should be provided by:
•  Expanding EU Socrates and Erasmus educational programmes to Ukra-
ine;
•  Exchanges between universities (which could be supported by Structural 
and Complementation Measures, which is open for group activities);
•  Promoting internships, especially short-term and specialised in order 
to prevent the brain drain phenomenon;   
•  Providing support to partnership projects between universities in the 
EU and Ukraine in the development of education programmes. Projects 
should be undertaken in collaboration with the Ministry of Education 
to ensure implementation of programmes in the Ukrainian education 
system. Partnership with smaller university centres (in the regions) sho-
uld be especially developed;
•  Offering small grants to support educational initiatives undertaken by 
NGOs (innovations in education, distance learning, small community 
schools, multicultural education in the border regions).
Supporting centres for European studies. Elaboration of curricula for Eu-
ropean studies at universities should be the task of the European Commis-
sion Delegation to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.
4.5. Cross-border co-operation (CBS)
Border regions tend to suffer from being on the political periphery and 
often are characterised by relatively low population density, low socio-econo-
mic growth and limited infrastructure. All this is true for the border regions 
between the enlarged EU and Ukraine. South-eastern Poland, eastern Slova-
kia and eastern Hungary as well as western Ukraine are the most underdeve-
loped regions of their respective countries. This factor is one of the obstacles 
to effective cross-border co-operation (CBS) between these countries. 
Another important issue is the difference in political system – centrali-
sed in Ukraine and to a great extent decentralised in its western neighbo-
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urs. In Ukraine, the real power of local authorities is very limited. Even the 
regional (oblast) authorities have very limited competencies when compa-
red to their Hungarian, Polish and Slovak counterparts. For example – bor-
der-crossing stations in Poland are the responsibility of the voivodship (re-
gional level) while in Ukraine they only report to the central authorities. 
This difference in competencies of regional authorities is a real obstacle in 
organising any kind of CBC. This kind of co-operation is usually important 
on the local level and perceived as the key issue by local authorities while 
it is not necessarily among the priorities of the central authorities. The ela-
boration and implementation of territorial-administrative reform is needed 
in Ukraine in order to clearly delineate responsibilities of different levels of 
government. The regional development strategy, designed to foster CBC in 
border regions should be implemented.
EU enlargement and the introduction of the Schengen regime will have 
the greatest impact on the regions along the EU’s future eastern border. Ne-
vertheless, there is an acute lack of awareness of opportunities arising from 
enlargement. In order to overcome this deficit and increase its engagement 
in the areas along its new external border, the EU should create EU regio-
nal offices along its external border in the new member states and Ukraine. 
These regional offices would:
•  offer a direct channel of communication to and for EU decision-ma-
kers;
•  become a direct point of contact with regional and local authorities 
and other regional actors;
•  conduct on-going informational campaigns to deepen the understan-
ding of the EU and highlight opportunities arising from enlargement 
(e.g. for collaboration with partners from the member states and fun-
ding opportunities).
4.5.1. Development of Euroregions
Several Euroregions with Ukrainian participation have been established, 
modelled on western European initiatives, such as the Carpathian Eurore-
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gion (which includes parts of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania) and 
Euroregion Bug (which includes parts of Poland and Belarus). Despite some 
achievements, Euroregions have not lived up to expectations mainly becau-
se of lack of financing and indecisiveness as well as the lack of experience 
among local and regional governmental bodies.
Nevertheless, Euroregions remain key instruments for CBS between Ukra-
ine and the enlarged EU. They promote dialogue between the regional politi-
cal elites, provide fora for the transfer of know-how, which then serves to bo-
ost institutional capacity, and promote development and contribute to incre-
asing the prosperity of territories which have yet to overcome the effects of 
socio-economic underdevelopment and political marginalisation. However, 
the full potential of Euroregions in these key regards has yet to be realised.
In order to increase its efficiency and flexibility, the Carpathian Euro-
region needs to be reduced in size or divided into several smaller Eurore-
gions. Lviv oblast has very little common interests with, for example,the 
Marmaros region of Romania while they both are included in the Carpa-
thian Euroregion. Euroregion Bug seems to be more flexible and have a bet-
ter institutional framework for effective co-operation. The EU should har-
ness the potential of the Euroregions along the future external border of 
the enlarged EU by:
•  assisting the countries in question in developing local and regional 
government structures that are capable of engaging and managing 
CBC;
•  setting up a dedicated task-force to support Euroregions through the 
co-ordination of the EU’s various activities and funding opportunities 
and programmes (including the elaboration of the New Neighbour-
hood Instrument);
•  promoting the creation of multicultural educational programmes for 
the border communities (in particular in Euroregions with large ethnic 
minorities) to raise awareness of neighbouring cultures and co-ope-
ration to stimulate the preparation of studies on socio-economic de-
velopment;
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•  promoting ecological projects on both sides of the future EU-Ukraine 
border, cleaning of the Bug and Tisza rivers for example.
4.5.2. Co-operation on regional planning and building 
           co-operation capacity
When developing a cross-border relationship on the local level, the im-
portant issue is the acquisition of relevant basic knowledge by representa-
tives of local authorities of procedures and particularities on the other side 
of the border. This knowledge should concern, first of all, the legal system 
of neighbouring country, EU regulations and possibilities to get funds for 
local development. Local governments need to be prepared to co-operate 
with NGOs that can provide invaluable help both in terms of strategy plan-
ning as well as fundraising. 
It might be beneficial to organise a scholarship fund for local govern-
ment officials or representatives from both sides of the future EU-Ukrainian 
border in order to raise their qualifications and prepare them to identify pro-
blems and solve them co-operatively. Such common education would also 
result in good personal relationships and contacts, which are especially va-
luable, and valued, in small local communities.
In order to make the cross-border co-operation effective, local govern-
ments on both sides of the borders need to have compatible prerogatives. 
The decision making process should be moved as low in the administrative 
hierarchy as possible.
In East-Central Europe international regional planning is only in the early 
stages of development. There are examples of such activity on Slovak-Hunga-
rian or Polish-Slovak borders, but co-operation between Ukraine and new EU 
member states is far from satisfactory. Euroregions seem to be a good insti-
tutional framework for cross-border spatial planning. In Euroregion Bug the-
re is a Working Group on Spatial Development, Communication and Trans-
port (with the head office in Lublin). Carpathian Euroregion does not even 
have a similar structure.
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It is recommended to create cross-border working groups on spatial de-
velopment on the district and regional levels tasked with creating local and 
regional plans. These plans should be co-ordinated with national ones, so 
there is a need for co-operation between ministries responsible for spatial 
planning on both sides of future EU-Ukrainian border. The creation of insti-
tutional frameworks for this kind of co-operation is especially important in 
light of EU declarations to give the financial support to bilateral or multi-
lateral cross-border projects from Interreg/Tacis funds. Such newly created 
institutions need to be prepared to apply for these funds and be capably of 
absorbing them effectively and efficiently.
4.5.3. Tourism
The border regions between Ukraine and the new member states can 
potentially become a very attractive destination for tourism. The natural as-
sets of these areas are unique landscapes, fragments of primeval forests, si-
tes for rare flora, animal and human refuges and partly preserved folk cul-
ture and traditional architecture. 
One of the projects that aimed to take advantage of this beautiful re-
gion and exploit its tourist potential was the East Carpathian Biosphere 
Reserve. However, this has not been successful either in attracting touri-
sts or as an instrument to develop infrastructure. When planning the de-
velopment of Carpathian region’s tourist potential, it would be beneficial 
to use the experience of Polish-Slovak and Polish-Czech borderland: in-
ternational tourist routes on the border, marked areas where tourists can 
stay without the formal procedure of crossing the border etc. For exam-
ple Kremenaros, the mountain where three borders meet (Polish, Slovak 
and Ukrainian), would be a great place to organise such an international 
tourist border-crossing station. Initially, the promotion of tourism in this 
region requires more good will and vision than investments. However, la-
ter investments will be crucial in order to make possible the building of, 
for example, a network of shelters, hostels and other tourist-oriented in-
frastructure.
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5.  A Road map for the EU 
and Ukraine 
Below we offer a ‘road map’ for Ukraine’s integration with the EU, divi-
ded into distinct stages. It is emphasised that this is not a timetable with spe-
cific dates since progress on the road map depends primarily on Ukraine’s 
reform efforts. It is thus a matter for Ukrainian authorities to determine how 
quickly to move towards the end of the road map, which is requisite if Ukra-
ine is to be considered a credible candidate for EU membership.
5.1. Political Declaration
As part of its Wider Europe initiative, the EU is currently developing an 
Action Plan for its relations with Ukraine, to be completed in spring 2004. The 
finalisation of this Action Plan should be accompanied by a political declara-
tion by the EU. In order to send a clear signal of the European prospect for 
Ukraine, this should be declared prior to the presidential elections schedu-
led for late October 2004. The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 provides 
an appropriate moment for such a declaration. At the latest, this declaration 
could be made by the European Council at their summit in October 2004.
This declaration should take the form of a purely political statement by 
the EU designed to deliver a strong, unambiguous message of the impor-
tance of Ukraine to Europe. It should explicitly acknowledge that Ukraine, 
as a European country, is eligible for EU membership as a matter of princi-
ple. Equally important, it should state that, in light of the current state of 
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reform, Ukraine is regarded as moving further away from being considered 
a candidate for EU accession.
The Action Plan should spell out a detailed road map of future relations. 
A new contractual arrangement between the EU and Ukraine should be a cen-
tral staging post along this ‘road’. This agreement should considerably upgra-
de Ukraine’s relations with the EU. The political declaration should spell out 
clearly the conditions for opening negotiations on a new agreement.
5.2. Implementation of conditions for negotiating 
     a new agreement
The above mentioned conditions should be broader, more explicit, and 
more ‘political’ in scope than the mainly technocratic requirements of the 
PCA. The conditions for starting negotiations on a new agreement should bu-
ild on the EU’s own experience of previous and current enlargement proces-
ses and the requirements of the Council of Europe. However, as the end-goal 
at this stage is less than EU membership, and in order not to attenuate the 
mobilising effect of political conditions, these should be more limited than 
the criteria required of prospective EU candidates. 
They should, for instance, be more limited in economics and in areas 
where reform is by nature a protracted process, for instance public admini-
stration and judicial reform. It should focus on the implementation in Ukra-
ine of basic European political principles and practices as absolute require-
ments for moving ahead with the road map. This would include significant 
measures to ensure the freedom of the media, free and fair of elections, im-
prove human rights and the justice system. 
The upcoming presidential elections provide an opportunity on many of 
these counts, by granting the opposition equal access to the media, redu-
cing the political control over state media, eliminating the abuses for poli-
tical aims of the judicial system and ending persecution of private business 
associated with the opposition through taxation and the legal system. In ad-
dition, it should also include current short-term priorities, such as WTO ac-
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cession. Ukraine should also be warned that the ‘Common Economic Space’, 
planned between Ukraine and three CIS states, is incompatible with even-
tual EU membership.
It should be underlined that all the possibilities inscribed in the Dec-
laration, which would pave the way to a new agreement, should be made 
conditional, and come into force only after the necessary steps have been 
taken by Ukraine in the implementation of political and economic reforms. 
The detailed and explicit set of priorities as well as built-in conditions wo-
uld lead to step-by-step integration only if, or when, Ukraine fulfils its ob-
jectives and obligations, subject to evaluation and continuous monitoring 
mechanism. 
5.3. The new agreement
The new agreement could be modelled on the association agreements 
signed by the Central and Eastern European states in the early 1990s, espe-
cially given the desirability of a strong ‘political dialogue’. Borrowing from 
the more recent agreements signed by Western Balkan states, the new agre-
ement with Ukraine should embrace JHA and CFSP issues, as well as incorpo-
rating more recent developments such as the creation of the ESDP. Similar-
ly to the other agreements mentioned above, progressive step-by-step inte-
gration should be an integral part of the new EU-Ukraine agreement, speci-
fying the conditions required for further integration and inclusion of Ukra-
ine in EU policies. 
One would thus, for example, move gradually towards a free trade area, 
followed by a customs union and inclusion in the single market. Similar steps 
could be envisaged for the movement of people, with removal of Ukraine 
from the visa ‘black list’ followed by the gradual liberalisation of movement 
towards the long-term aim of inclusion in the Schengen regime. The agre-
ement should provide for extensive Ukrainian participation in EU program-
mes and inclusion in the numerous committees assisting the Commission 
in preparing new legislation.
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5.4. Candidate status and accession negotiations
In order to be acknowledged as a candidate for EU membership, Ukra-
ine would need to prove sustained efforts towards implementation of this 
new agreement. The opening of accession negotiations should depend on 
full implementation of the agreement coupled with the fulfilment of the Co-
penhagen criteria.
5. A Road map for the EU and Ukraine
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Abbreviations and acronyms
CARDS – Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation 
CBC – Cross-Border Co-operation 
CES – Common Economic Space 
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EEA – European Economic Area 
EFC – European Foundation Centre 
EFTA – European Free Trade Association
EIB – European Investment Bank 
EIDHR – European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy 
FATF – Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
FDI – foreign direct investment 
IFIs – international financial institutions 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
INOGATE – Interstate Oil and Gas Transport
ISPA – Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
IVF – International Visegrad Fund 
JHA – Justice and Home Affairs 
KFOR – Kosovo Force 
LITPOLBAT – Polish-Lithuanian battalion 
NBU – National Bank of Ukraine 
NGO – non-governmental organisation
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSI – Open Society Institutes 
PCA – Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
Phare –  Poland and Hungary: Action for the Restructuring the Economy (assistance pro-
gramme for Central and East European countries)
REC – Regional Environmental Centres 
SAPARD – Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
SIS – Schengen Information System 
Tacis – Technical assistance Programme for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TRACECA – Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia 
UKRPOLBAT – Polish-Ukrainian battalion 
WNIS – Western Newly Independent States
WTO – World Trade Organisation
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The Enlarged EU and Ukraine include:
More than a Neighbour. Proposals for the EU’s policy towards Ukraine, 
edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl and Katary-
na Wolczuk, Warsaw 2003. Available in  English and Ukrainian
Йоанна Конєчна, Поляки–українці, Польща–Україна. Парадокси 
стосунків між сусідами за даними соціологічних досліджень, [Joanna 
Konieczna, Poles and Ukrainians, Poland and Ukraine. The Paradoxes of Ne-
igbourly Relations], Варшава–Київ 2003. Published in association with the 
Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine
European Integration of Ukraine as Viewed by Top Ukrainian Politicians, 
Businessmen and Society Leaders According to Standard Interviews, War-
saw 2003. Available in English and Ukrainian, published in association with 
the Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine
More than Neighbours. The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine – New 
Relations, Policy Paper, edited by Jakub Boratyński, Igor Burakovsky, Boris 
Dodonov, Alexander Duleba, Grzegorz Gromadzki, Olexiy Haran, Małgorza-
ta Jakubiak, Joanna Konieczna, Iryna Kravchuk, Wolodymyr Nahirny, Olek-
sandr Sushko, Marius Vahl, Kataryna Wolczuk, Anna Wróbel, Przemysław Żu-
rawski vel Grajewski in collaboration with Michael Emerson, Zsuzsa Ludvig, 
Rostyslav Pavlenko, László Póti
For more publications, please see www.batory.org.pl/forum/ukraina_
ue.
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Recent publications in the series 
On the Future of Europe
O przyszłości Europy. Głosy polityków [On the Future of Europe. 
The Voices of Politicians] (2000), a selection of articles by European 
politicians expressing their opinion in the public debate in the EU about 
the future of the continent. Available in Polish. 
Policy Paper 1: Overcoming Alienation; Kaliningrad as a Russian 
Enclave Inside the European Union (January 2001); edited by Grzegorz 
Gromadzki and Andrzej Wilk; published in association with the ‘Borus-
sia‘ Culture Society and the Center for International Relations. Available 
in Polish and English.
Policy Paper 2: The Half-Open Door; the Eastern Border of the En-
larged European Union (March 2001); edited by Jakub Boratyński and 
Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Institute of Pub-
lic Affairs. Available in Polish, English and Russian.
Policy Paper 3: Pro-European Atlantists. Poland and Other Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe after Accession to the European Union 
(June 2001); edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki and Olaf Osica; published 
in association with the Center for International Relations. Available in 
Polish and English.
 
Policy Paper 4: The Forgotten Neighbour – Belarus in the Context of 
EU Eastern Enlargement (September 2001); edited by Anna Naumczuk, 
Eugeniusz Mironowicz, Grzegorz Gromadzki and Paweł Kazanecki; pub-
lished in association with the East-European Democratic Center – IDEE. 
Available in Polish, English, Russian and Belorusian.
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Policy Paper 5: The Common Challenge. Members and Candidates 
Facing the EU Future Migration Policy (December 2001); edited by 
Krystyna Iglicka, Sławomir Łodziński, Dariusz Stola, Jakub Boratyński 
and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Institute of 
Public Affairs and the Institute of Social Studies – Warsaw University. 
Available in Polish and English.
 
Policy Paper 6: New Neighbourhood – New Association Ukraine 
and the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century (March 
2002); edited by Bogumiła Berdychowska, Przemysław Żurawski vel 
Grajewski and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the 
Faculty of of International Studies and Political Science – University of 
Łódź, and the Polish-Ukrainian Forum. Available in Polish, English, Rus-
sian and Ukrainian. 
 
Policy Paper 7: An Overview of European (In) Security (June 2002); 
edited by Olaf Osica and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association 
with the Center for International Relations. Available in Polish and Eng-
lish.
 
Policy Paper 8: Between Need and Dependency. Russian Gas in the 
Energy Balance of the Enlarged EU. (December 2002); edited by Grze-
gorz Gromadzki. Available in Polish, English and Russian.
 
Poland in the World: Challenges, Achievements, Threats (Septem-
ber 2003); address by the Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimosze-
wicz, and the records of discussion featuring Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 
Jerzy Jedlicki, Maciej Łętowski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Dariusz Rosati, and 
Aleksander Smolar. 
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The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (2003); the pro-
ceedings of a conference organised by the Foundation in co-operation 
with the Polish Foreign Ministry; the publication includes the keynote 
addresses by Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Foreign 
Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a summary of all sessions, and the 
Polish non-paper with proposals on the future policy of the enlarged EU 
towards its new Eastern neighbours. Available in Polish and English.
Other publications on international relations
Polska–Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych [Poland–
–Ukraine. Co-operation of Non-Governmental Organisations] (Septem-
ber 2003); a presentation of Polish organisations’ experience of co-op-
eration with Ukraine, a description of activities and major institutions; 
published in association with the Education for Democracy Foundation. 
Available in Polish.
Belarus. Reform Scenarios (2003); a comprehensive study by Be-
lorusian experts featuring proposals of political, economic, social, and 
educational reforms of the country. Available in English, Russian and 
Belorusian.
